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On freedom and (im)mobility: how states create 
vulnerability by controlling human movement
Beyond Slavery editors introduce their volume on trafficking, smuggling 
and migration, arguing that mobility is central to life and that state 
restrictions on movement are the true threat to human wellbeing.
Julia O’Connell Davidson and Neil Howard
Mobility is widely understood as integral to human freedom, so much 
so that when injury, illness, or old age restrict our capacity to move 
we are commonly referred to as ‘dis-abled’. This is also what makes 
imprisonment, or even house arrest, such a profound and terrifying 
punishment. Whether nipping to the shops, commuting for work, or 
travelling for leisure, mobility is and always has been an essential part 
of humankind’s economic, social, cultural, and political life. To be able 
to move freely is a good. Yet in an unjust world, it is also an unearned 
and unequally distributed privilege. 
Historically, the mobility of those who lack social and political power 
has been heavily restricted by those who don’t. Slaves, servants, the 
poor, women, children—all these groups have had their mobility, at 
one point or another, restricted by those in power. The reasons why are 
obvious: the freedom to move allows the subordinate a chance to es-
cape from domination, to evade control, or to subvert the social order. 
Controlling mobility is controlling people.
Modern liberal states are no less keen to exercise this control than their 
illiberal forbears. Across the west, governments routinely criminalise 
the homeless, tie domestic workers to their employers, and force fam-
ilies on welfare to move to where the housing is cheaper. These are 
all policies to discipline ‘undesirable’ populations, and to subordinate 
them to the dominant social, cultural, economic, and racial orders. 
Nowhere is the naked injustice of all this made clearer than in contem-
porary immigration policies. Wealthy states literally sell citizenship to 
the highest and richest foreign bidders, while spending billions to keep 
the poor and the unwanted at bay. As we have saw throughout the year 
in the Mediterranean, and as we are continuing to see throughout Eu-
rope’s ongoing refugee crisis, this comes at an immense cost to human 
life. These deaths are no anomaly. The International Organisation for 
Migration has estimated that more than 40,000 people died between 
2000 and 2013 in the course of ‘irregular’ crossings around the world, 
including 22,000 at the borders of the EU. Under any other circum-
stances, this would be called a crime against humanity.
Importantly, the violence that states visit on would-be immigrants 
does not stop at the border. Those who survive hazardous journeys, or 
who become ‘illegal’ as a result of overstaying visas, failing in asylum 
claims, or simply failing to navigate Kafkaesque bureaucracies, often 
find themselves in situations that echo features of historical enslave-
ment. Stripped of their rights, they are held in for-profit immigration 
detention centres, violently coerced across borders during deporta-
tion, and forcibly separated from their family and loved ones. 
For those ‘lucky’ individuals who do manage to evade the authorities 
and enter the West, and even for those who acquire work visas and 
arrive through legal channels, what awaits is often a life of exclusion 
and exploitation in the most abusive sectors of the economy. They are 
frequently denied or prevented from accessing basic social protection. 
If their presence is illegalised, they are forbidden from contributing to 
the economy. And if present legally, their work visas frequently deny 
them freedom of movement within the labour market. As such, they 
can be driven into capital’s ever-needy reserve army of labour. 
All of this is hidden by mainstream political discourse around ‘human 
trafficking’ and ‘migrant smuggling’. ‘Smuggling’, we are told, is volun-
tary and consensual; ‘trafficking’ is the coerced equivalent of transat-
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lantic slavery. Yet both terms are used interchangeably, with politicians 
leaping to blame ‘the smugglers’ who ‘traffic in misery’ whenever bod-
ies wash up on shore or are found decomposing in the desert. 
Why is this? It is precisely in order to hide their complicity in the bor-
der deaths that shame our age, and so that they can de-polticise debates 
around lethal controls on human movement. The ‘smuggling-traffick-
ing’ frame allows those who move to be seen either as vulnerable to 
traffickers or at the risk of smuggling, in turn legitimating the replace-
ment of ‘protecting people’ with ‘preventing their movement’ or ‘send-
ing them back home’ once they’ve moved. It is this discourse, after 
all, that justified EU proposals for military action to smash smuggling 
networks in Libya. 
The essays we feature in this volume will counter dominant ideas about 
trafficking, smuggling, and migration. It will begin with the premise 
that mobility is integral to human life and flourishing, and will argue 
that state restrictions on the freedom of movement are the true threat 
to human wellbeing. 
Our first group of essays puts this threat into historical and theoretical 
context. Laura Brace opens the discussion by examining the dialectic 
between mobility and immobility during the period of European co-
lonial expansion, and argues persuasively that the liberty of the ‘free’ 
required the immobility of their opposite—the subordinate. Patrizia 
Testai and Julija Sardelić examine the ways in which the totalitarian 
states of yesteryear controlled and constructed people through mo-
bility regimes, and they reflect on the continuing legacies of this con-
trol today. A key theme in their articles is the productivity of mobility 
controls, which is driven home by the final two essays in this group, 
by Harald Bauder and Nicholas De Genova. Bauder examines how 
the unequal distribution of the right to move is everywhere integral 
to the creation and segmentation of capitalist labour markets, while 
De Genova explores the way state power itself is constituted by the 
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performativity of borders and deportation.
Our second group of essays moves on to examine the lived consequenc-
es of the deployment of this state power in the governance of human 
movement. These consequences are so grave and at times so brutal that 
we have no fewer than nine different authors examining as many dif-
ferent cases. Roxanne Lynn Doty, Lucy Williams, Rhian Benyon, Roda 
Madziva, Stephanie Silverman, Kirsten Han, Mark Johnson, Letizia 
Palumbo and Alessandra Sciurba all show how (im)mobility policies 
destroy family life, prevent torture survivors from reaching safety, ren-
der migrant workers vulnerable to exploitation, and demean destitute 
asylum seekers.
Our third group of essays attacks the single major discourse responsi-
ble for hiding all this injustice—that of human trafficking. Edlie Wong, 
Julia O’Connell Davidson, Luke de Noronha, Lucrecia Rubio-Grun-
dell, Kyungee Kook, Inka Stock, Lyndsey Beutin and Sverre Molland 
all question the meaning and utility of the concepts of ‘trafficking’ and 
‘smuggling’, laying bare the gulf between the rhetoric surrounding 
these concepts and the lived realities of the people labeled by them. 
Lastly, in our fourth and final group of essays, we point to the moral 
and practical imperative of an alternative future that lies beyond bor-
ders. The Alarm Phone’s piece, ‘Ferries not Frontex!’, shows why pol-
icies that facilitate mobility would be an altogether better response 
to migrant deaths in the Mediterranean, while Joseph Carens and 
Antoine Pécoud make the case for a world with fully free movement. 
This case is one that features far too infrequently in campaigns against 
migrant deaths, ‘human trafficking’ or ‘modern slavery’. But it is abso-
lutely essential, and should be endorsed by anyone who is genuinely 
concerned to see greater freedom in the contemporary world.

Section one
The state construction 
of (im)mobility
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Overcoming space: mobility and history
Mobility is integral to human life, but not all mobility is treated as 
equivalent. What happens to those who are unable to move away from 
wilderness and into history?
Laura Brace
We are all ‘mobile individuals’ living in a world that has been struc-
tured by mobility. As political theorist Thomas Hobbes argued in the 
seventeenth century, we are matter in motion. That motion, the rest-
lessness that ceases only in death, tells us that we are alive and human. 
Mobility itself is understood as a human good, a positive value and a 
general principle of modernity. The liberal possibility that we are free 
to pursue our own good involves choosing our own path. It suggests 
we can change the story of our lives by moving its location, altering 
the supporting cast of characters and giving ourselves new opportuni-
ties, opening up new horizons. In this context, mobility is understood 
as increasing personal freedom and widening opportunities, and it is 
inextricably linked to the idea of modernity as progress. Mobility al-
lows us to break away from tradition, to accelerate social change and to 
become civilised. In its connection with civilisation, mobility emerges 
from this historical context as a relational concept. The mobility of 
some relies on the immobility of others. 
This relation between mobility and immobility helped structure co-
lonialism. Settler colonies were not primarily established to extract 
surplus value from indigenous labour, but to displace indigenous peo-
ple from the land. This meant that settler colonies were premised on 
the elimination of native societies—the colonisers came to stay. Early 
liberal theorists like John Locke held that this was justifiable in the 
Americas. Although the indigenous people lived on fertile land capa-
ble of producing food and other resources in abundance, he argued, 
they had put themselves outside the current of history by failing to 
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realise the potential value of what they had. By clinging to tradition 
they remained outside market society, with no hope of commerce with 
the rest of the world. They had made themselves immobile. As a result, 
Locke said, ‘A King of a large and fruitful Territory there feeds, lodges, 
and is clad worse than a day labourer in England’.
The English colonists based their claim to virtuous ownership on ag-
ricultural plantation and cultivation, growing sugar in Barbados and 
tobacco in New England. They put up fences and rooted themselves 
in the soil in ways that suggested immobility, but the new crops they 
brought, the towns they established to trade with England, and their 
commerce with the rest of the world were all about expansion and 
appropriation and so about mobility, modernity, and progress. Their 
sense of mission meant that they felt they had God’s authority to en-
close the ‘vacant lands’ of America. They used the English courts to 
command the Americans to fence their land. When they did not do so, 
the settlers regarded the land as being actively neglected. The Indians 
may have occupied the land, but they had failed to fulfil God’s com-
mandment to subdue the earth. 
Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and sub-
due it: and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over 
the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth 
upon the earth. —Genesis 1:28
Instead, they had left the grass to rot and the fruit unpicked, and their 
land could still be looked upon as waste. They were seen as immobil-
ised by their inability to get beyond subsistence. Their “dependence 
on the spontaneous productions of nature to supply almost all their 
wants”, Ronald Takaki observes, allowed settlers to imagine indige-
nous peoples as ‘wild’ beings, suspended in a state of nature.
Through seventeenth century European eyes, the indigenous Amer-
icans were conceived as immobile because they failed to use their 
18 • opendemocracy.net/beyondslavery
Beyond Trafficking and Slavery
minds to expand their horizons beyond the ordinary wants of the 
body: fishing, hunting, dancing, and revenge. Locke’s understanding 
of the Indians as savage was based on his conviction that they were 
unable to extend their thoughts through literacy and conversation, 
so that their minds could not attain a ‘comprehensive enlargement’. 
They had the potential to exercise reason, but to “achieve sufficient 
moral sophistication one needed to enter a polite and civil world”, as 
Daniel Carey puts it. English men, by contrast, were seen as living in 
a superior society where they could pursue their desires and engage 
in international exchange. They could travel, leaving their civilised 
worlds to investigate the customs, inclinations, beliefs, and habits of 
others, to study the Indians and their environment, to cultivate their 
own worldliness.
Within this structure of thought, in the beginning all the world was 
America. The peoples Locke found there ‘show us our history’. By con-
structing the Native Americans as wild and primitive, as yet unaware 
of the value of private property and of God’s grand design for the earth, 
Locke placed them in the past. Once there, they could be subjected 
to a narrative in which their current practices would—inexorably—
be transformed into those of Europe. In this sense, America appears 
at the beginning of history, not yet fully distinguished from nature. 
The inhabitants’ inability to progress would have to change, but their 
mobility would have to be regulated by the politeness and civilisation 
of European society. As Georg Hegel later argued about Africa in the 
Philosophy of History, there are some “strange places that are located 
in the world but not in history”. Such places remain as states of nature: 
unhistorical, immobile in time as well as space.
The historical immobility of the indigenous populations of America 
and Africa underpins what Frank B. Wilderson identifies as the “black 
invisibility and namelessness” at the heart of slavery. Immobilising 
certain people so that others can travel means placing restrictions on 
some people’s agency, denying them the possibility of being protago-
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nists and of generating their own historical categories of entitlement 
and sovereignty. ‘We are off the record’, says Wilderson of black Ameri-
cans, ‘We live in the world, but exist outside of civil society’. Something 
about this distinction, it seems to me, helps to explain the disturbing 
ambivalence of current reactions to the drowning of mobile African 
individuals in the Mediterranean.  It has made it possible for the Brit-
ish government and the EU to lament the tragedy for the world while 
withdrawing search and rescue operations in order to protect their 
own civil societies.
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The border spectacle of migrant ‘victimisation’ 
There’s nothing self-evident about ‘illegal’ migration. When borders 
become a spectacle of migrant deaths, discourses of ‘victimisation’ by 
‘smugglers’ distract us from the real causes of migrant illegalisation.
Nicholas De Genova
We are led to believe that there is something self-evident and straight-
forward about migrant ‘illegality’. Some migrants are categorised as 
‘illegal’ because they have presumably violated ‘the Law’. Yet in most 
depictions of these migrants, there is little if any account of what the 
law truly is, or of how it came to be so. The law, after all, has a history, 
and it is a deeply politicised history of deliberate and more or less cal-
culated interventions. As such, it is impossible to contemplate the real 
social and political condition of migrants outside of the larger contexts 
that produce specific predicaments of ‘illegality’.
Migrants only become ‘illegal’ when legislative or enforcement-based 
measures render particular migrations or types of migration ‘ille-
gal’—or in other words, illegalise them. From this standpoint, there 
are not really ‘illegal’ migrants so much as illegalised migrants. The 
real origins of such illegalisations are to be found in the deliberations, 
debates, and decisions of lawmakers. The law that illegalises migrants 
remains largely invisible, while the spectre of the devious and cunning 
migrant becomes hyper-visible through mass media representations 
of border policing. This is what I have described in my book Working 
the Boundaries as a spectacle of enforcement at ‘the border’, whereby 
migrant ‘illegality’ is rendered spectacularly visible.
The Border Spectacle sets a scene that appears to be all about ‘exclu-
sion’, where allegedly ‘unwanted’ or ‘undesirable’—and in any case, 
‘unqualified’ or ‘ineligible’—migrants must be stopped, kept out, and 
turned around. At the same time, the border appears to demonstrate, 
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verify, and legitimate the purported naturalness and putative necessity 
of such exclusion. The concrete practices of border policing interweave 
with this sort of language and imagery to turn migrant ‘illegality’ into 
a seemingly ‘real’ thing. 
This scene of exclusion is nevertheless always accompanied by its shad-
owy, publicly unacknowledged or disavowed, obscene supplement: the 
large-scale recruitment of illegalised migrants as legally vulnerable, 
precarious, and thus tractable labour. In the face of increasingly for-
tified, militarised, and securitised borders, those who elude detection 
and evade apprehension are rewarded with the protracted and indefi-
nite social condition called ‘illegality’ and all its attendant deprivations. 
Above all, migrant ‘illegality’ is accompanied by deportability: the 
possibility of being forcibly removed from the space of the state. It is 
this grim prospect of coercive expulsion that characterises their labour 
power. Extraordinarily vulnerable workers living in permanent fear of 
the law are, after all, very lucrative for employers. The exclusionary 
brashness of the Border Spectacle, then, is inseparable from its ob-
scene underbelly: the real social relation of illegalised migrants to the 
state, and the secret of their abject inclusion as ‘illegal’ labour.
Obscene inclusion
The Border Spectacle, as we have seen, conjures up the image of mi-
grants’ transgression of borders. It works its magic trick of displacing 
‘illegality’ from its point of production—the processes of lawmak-
ing—to the so-called ‘scene of the crime’. This, of course, doubles as the 
scene of ostensible crime fighting, a key part of making the border a 
preeminent scene of exclusion. Human mobility nevertheless prevails. 
This happens despite the accumulated pressure and violence inflicted 
at borders, zones which are increasingly intruding into the ‘interior’ 
of the nation-state’s space and the everyday lives of both migrants and 
citizens. These dynamics that illegalise migrants and produce the con-
ditions for their exploitation are what I call their obscene inclusion.
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Obscenity is less about concealment than selective exposure. Even 
as the state’s lawmaking produces migrant ‘illegality’ as an enduring 
‘problem’, spectacles of border policing nonetheless reaffirm the ex-
istence of a subordinate reserve army of deportable labour ready and 
available within the space of the nation-state. In this way, the Border 
Spectacle appears to show the state’s diligent but ever-beleaguered ‘re-
sponse’ to the phantom ‘crisis’ of border invasion by desperate hordes 
of ‘illegal’ migrants and asylum-seekers. The nightmarish invasiveness, 
relentlessness, and ubiquity of ‘illegal’ migration then serves to sum-
mon forth ever more intense and expansive intrusions of state power 
into everyday life for everyone.
The related discourses of ‘human trafficking’ and ‘migrant smuggling’ 
further allow the state to fashion itself as a paternalistic (indeed, patri-
archal) “protection racket”, to use Charles Tilly’s term. In these instanc-
es, the state’s ‘protection’ is benevolently extended beyond its ‘rightful’ 
citizens to include some migrants, particularly women purportedly 
rescued from the intrinsic criminal excesses of ‘illegal’ migration itself. 
The ‘trafficking’ discourse thus narrowly identifies the source of the 
migrants’ ‘exploitation’ as a ‘foreign’ one—‘smugglers’, and the whole 
‘opportunistic’ infrastructure of ‘illegal’ migration itself. In this way, 
illegalised migrants are deemed to be in need of ‘protection’—from 
one another!
Almost never do such discourses interrogate the larger border and 
immigration regimes creating the need for precarious and vulnerable 
forms of ‘illegal’ border crossing, and consequently broadening the 
space to exploit migrants and asylum-seekers. At the same time, the 
exposure of pitiful and helpless ‘victims’ of ‘migrant smuggling’ none-
theless verifies the existence of a shadowy population of docile and 
infinitely tractable migrant denizens. In this respect, we see again how 
the Border Spectacle—as a scene of exclusion—affirms the obscene 
fact of a kind of subordinate inclusion. The sanctimonious but fun-
damentally hypocritical discourses decrying ‘migrant smuggling’ and 
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‘human trafficking’ serve as premier examples of the Border Spectacle’s 
acts of obscenity, exposing its own ‘dirty secret’.
Essentialised exploitability
The representation of migrants as either ‘victims’ or opportunistic 
‘criminals’ effectively erases the kind of agency that might count as 
self-determination. The disqualification of these illegalised migrants 
from the capacity for self-determination furthermore implies that they 
are incompetent for self-government and democratic citizenship. This 
framing effectively reduces the exploitation of ‘illegal’ migrations to 
little more than a verification of their exploitability: their subjugation 
merely seems to prove their essential slavishness. This transposes the 
politics of citizenship and the inequalities of immigration into an es-
sentialist politics of ‘difference’ that appears to arise from the migrants’ 
‘foreignness’.
The unequal politics of citizenship, which is institutionalised in immi-
gration law, produces migrant ‘illegality’. The Border Spectacle system-
atically re-renders that same ‘illegality’ into a quasi-inherent deficiency 
of the migrants themselves. This displacement of juridical inequalities 
and border injustices onto the illegalised migrants themselves—in-
cluding patronising discourses that present migrants as purely passive 
‘victims’—inevitably contributes to the migrants’ racialisation.
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Illegalised migrants and temporary foreign 
workers: the international segmentation of labour
Labour markets are segmented, and the vulnerability at the bottom 
underpins the stability and benefit at the top. States use migration 
controls to maintain the docility of the bottom rung.
Harald Bauder
The collapse of an eight-story garment factory in Bangladesh in April 
2013 killed more than 1,000 workers and injured 2,500 more, shocking 
the world and drawing global attention to the horrific working condi-
tions and lack of safety standards that exist in the global south. Two 
years earlier, the death of ten overworked temporary migrant workers 
in a car crash in Canada raised public awareness of the exploitative 
working conditions that these migrants endure. Although the settings 
for these two events could not have been more different—Bangladesh 
is one of the poorest countries in the world and Canada is one of the 
wealthiest—they both reflect an international segmentation of labour 
that characterises a global economy feeding off the vulnerabilities of 
‘third world’ labour. 
Industrialised economies have long been dependent on the labour 
that international migrants provide. Migrant workers are attractive 
to many employers precisely because they are vulnerable: the deni-
al of their rights, status, and citizenship prospects leaves them open 
to various types of exploitation (e.g. lower wages). Governments are 
complicit in this strategy, and as an increasing number of people mi-
grate to Europe, North America, and other wealthy countries to escape 
poverty and exploitation, governments are devising ways to maintain 
these migrants’ vulnerability. 
Temporary foreign worker programmes deny migrants the opportuni-
ty to stay in the country and become citizens. In Canada, a country of 
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35 million, the number of temporary foreign workers has skyrocketed 
to about half a million, and now exceeds the number of permanent im-
migrants. These workers tend to be highly vulnerable, because many 
of them are only permitted to work for one particular employer and 
dismissal can result in deportation.
The most vulnerable and exploitable workers, however, are illegalised 
migrants who do not possess the government’s authorisation to be in 
the country and thus lack government protection from abuse. Using 
the term illegalised migrant—rather than undocumented, irregular, 
non-status, or ‘illegal’—draws attention to the laws and practices, es-
tablished by governments, that deny these migrants legal rights. Re-
searchers estimate that more than 10 million illegalised migrants live 
in the USA alone.
In wealthy economies, temporary foreign workers and illegalised 
migrants constitute a segment below the existing labour market. In 
this segment, employers get away with paying below-standard wages, 
neglecting labour safety regulations, and abusing workers. Workers 
risk deportation whenever they resist their unfair treatment. They are 
therefore left with little choice but to endure these conditions.  
Many people believe that labour markets treat all workers fairly based 
on their merit, capacities, and preferences, and that labour markets 
operate best when governments do not interfere. Actual practice, 
however, is very different. Research shows that labour markets are in 
fact organised into hierarchical segments, which not only offer very 
different pay and working conditions but also apply different rules of 
engagement and labour practices. In the top segment are high-paying 
and secure jobs with substantial career development opportunities. In-
dividual workers in this segment possess considerable clout in negoti-
ating their terms of employment. At the opposite end of the spectrum 
sit the most vulnerable and exploitable workers, who receive little pay, 
few benefits, experience a high level of employment insecurity, and are 
26 • opendemocracy.net/beyondslavery
Beyond Trafficking and Slavery
the ones fired first when employers are struggling. In short, they are 
disposable. They serve to absorb the shocks of business fluctuations, 
thereby enabling privileged workers in upper segments of the labour 
market to enjoy greater job stability.
Segmented labour markets are not an academic construct, but the 
harsh reality that millions of workers confront every day. In my book 
Labor Movement, I showed how various mechanisms interact to deval-
ue migrant labour, disproportionately allocating them to the bottom 
segment of the labour market. Blatant racial discrimination is obvi-
ous, however more subtle but equally effective ways of disadvantaging 
migrants exist on the basis of their foreign credentials, accents, and 
behaviours that seem alien to employers and customers. 
Since publishing this book almost a decade ago, I noticed that govern-
ments are  intensifying their efforts to create a vulnerable and exploit-
able labour force by denying migrants their rights and the prospect of 
citizenship. In particular, temporary foreign worker programmes and 
Apparel Factory in Dhaka. NYU Stern BHR/Flickr. Creative Commons.
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the illegalisation of migrants are these governments’ preferred mecha-
nisms of devaluing migrant labour. 
Europe, the United States, and other wealthy regions are closing their 
external borders to migrants and tightening their refugee laws and 
policies. Migrants who cross the border without the government’s 
authorisation, or who remain in the country although their refugee 
claims were rejected, are thereby being increasingly illegalised, putting 
them in extremely vulnerable positions. Canada, which is sheltered 
geographically from ‘unauthorised’ migration, relies more heavily 
on its temporary foreign worker programmes to create a docile and 
exploitable labour force at the bottom of the labour market. Many of 
these foreign workers integrate into their local communities, make 
friends, and see the future of their children in Canada. Some of them 
decide to stay beyond the expiration of their visa or permit. They too 
become illegalised. 
The use of temporary foreign workers and illegalised migrant labour 
changes the geographical structure of global inequality but does not 
alleviate it. Global corporations may exploit the vulnerable situation 
of workers in places like Bangladesh, Indonesia, or Mexico to cheap-
ly produce garments, electronics, and other consumer goods. When 
these workers migrate to North America, Europe, or the Persian Gulf 
to escape the poverty, exploitation, and inhuman conditions in their 
countries of origin, they are systematically exploited in these coun-
tries as foreign workers or illegalised migrants. In this way, restrictive 
migration policies and practices only reproduce an international seg-
mentation of labour within the industrialised economies.
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Fascist legacies: Italy’s approach to mobility and 
mobile labour
Italy abolished Mussolini-era laws restricting internal mobility in the 
1960s, yet troubling continuities exist between these regulations and 
current efforts to control Italy’s migrant population.
Patrizia Testai
Italy’s legal and policy approach to immigration is widely seen as a 
relatively recent improvisation by a state adjusting to the country’s new 
status as a migrant-receiving area. And yet Italy’s history of labour mo-
bility stretches back to pre-unitary years, and includes both spectacu-
lar outward movements across Europe and continents as well as micro 
and macro internal movements of populations from the impoverished 
countryside and the country’s southern area. This article intends to 
reconnect the country’s present approach to mobility to its past history 
of internal migration. In doing this, it will highlight specific elements 
of continuity in particular with fascist rules and practices over internal 
labour mobility.  
The Italian state has endeavoured to control its highly mobile popu-
lation ever since its creation in 1861. In doing so, it produced a range 
of marginal subjects that were later condensed into the figure of the 
‘southern emigrant’. One such mechanism of control linked residence 
to work contracts. During the 1920s and 1930s, the fascist regime set 
up a complex system of labour institutions and population registry 
offices. These served to establish a dividing line between local and 
‘foreign’ workers, namely those who formally enjoyed Italian citizen-
ship but who had moved from impoverished rural areas to the cities. 
Only workers officially resident and enrolled in the fascist union were 
allowed to be regularly employed under this system. The rest were en-
couraged to establish rural communities within the national territory 
and work the fields and marshlands there. Behind the fascist rheto-
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ric about ruralising Italy, such measures sought to address what was 
perceived as a more pressing problem: the need to protect the urban 
middle class from poor immigrants, who were considered as parasites 
living in idleness and spreading corruption. 
This administrative solution to internal mobility did not make Italians 
less mobile, but local administrators’ fiddling with unemployment lists 
allowed for the creation of a pool of irregular cheap labour recruited 
in seasonal work and other exploitative sectors. The refusal to grant 
legal domicile to these workers made them all the more marginal as 
their access to health services and social housing depended on their 
enrolment in municipal registries. 
Mussolini’s anti-urban law of 1939 proved very useful for post-war 
reconstruction. It was, in fact, applied by Republican Italy up to 1961, 
creating within cities enclaves of exploitable workers and, more gen-
erally, a ‘flexible’ industrialisation through the use of the irregular 
employment of non-residents. This system linking work and resi-
dence was applied in the context of marked inequalities between an 
industrial north and a poor south, inequalities that underpinned the 
large-scale movements from south to north. It also formed the legal 
and institutional framework and provided the policy vocabulary that 
would shape future immigration policies and approaches towards new 
migrants coming from outside Europe.
The rules that, from the 1960s onward, began to regulate immigration 
flows were not made in a vacuum. They followed a well-established 
pattern in which migrant people, relegated to the margins of any form 
of social citizenship, were treated exclusively as workers. The evolution 
of Italian immigration policy shows a constant preoccupation with 
limiting entries and refusing migrants the rights afforded by Italian 
workers, even though by the 1980s it was clear that migrant workers 
were becoming a structural component of the Italian labour market. It 
was not until 1990 that Italy recognised basic health and social rights 
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for migrant workers, and the possibility of asylum for non-EU citi-
zens. Italy’s first coherent law on immigration, Consolidated Act n. 40 
of 1998, was a compromise born out of leftist and Catholic efforts to 
balance immigration control with social integration principles. This 
resulted in an uneasy mixture of entry quotas, new detention centres, 
and humanitarian provisions to protect and assist victims of traffick-
ing. The last of these often translated into paternalistic rehabilitation 
programmes to redeem street prostitutes. 
The act also attempted to loosen the link between entry and labour 
recruitment from abroad through the introduction of a sponsor figure, 
who would guarantee a prospective migrant’s board and lodging while 
they searched for work. However, this provision was abolished in 
2002 under Law n. 189 (the so-called Bossi-Fini law), and the balance 
between migrants’ rights and immigration control began to tilt once 
again towards the latter. The emphasis was now on patrolling borders 
and the forced return of unauthorised migrants. Moreover, bilateral 
agreements with third countries—especially with Libya in 2003 and 
2007—sought to establish an external system of border control (in-
cluding, in the case of Libya, the financing of detention centres there). 
The Bossi-Fini law also made visa rules for entry more restrictive than 
ever and tied entry more securely to a work contract through the so-
called ‘contratto di soggiorno’ (residence contract). 
By 2009 the circle was closed with the passing of a series of decrees 
forming the ‘security package’. The old system of internal controls 
was back. Full powers were granted to mayors on matters of securi-
ty, including the power to refuse the enrolment of certain citizens in 
municipal registries. The system of immigration control—tight visa 
entries combined with a link between a work contract and the right 
to stay—could now be reinforced with administrative rules aimed at 
controlling migrants’ mobility inside Italy and excluding them from 
social rights and services. The separating line between immigration 
management and migrant rights policies, which previous centre-left 
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coalition governments had tried to maintain in principle if not in prac-
tice, was now completely dissolved. Migrants who enter the national 
territory for the first time are now requested to sign an ‘integration 
agreement’ (Accordo di Integrazione) with the state to show that they 
are committed to respect and learn Italian civic norms, culture, and 
language if they want to stay in the country. 
Just as Mussolini’s anti-urban laws had marked immigrants as a trou-
blesome source of disorder, and just as southern workers had been ex-
cluded from protection as workers and from rights as citizens during 
post-war reconstruction, so mayors can now limit the right of residence 
to specific individuals deemed ‘undesirable’. These individuals are the 
various extra-comunitari (non-EU citizens), neo-comunitari (new EU 
citizens, in particular Romanians and Bulgarians), and the numerous 
refugees and asylum seekers who, after the North African crisis and 
consequent ‘emergency’ reception policy, have come to form a com-
plex constellation of differently excluded citizens within contemporary 
Italian society.
The militarised reception structures consolidated inside the Centri 
Polifunzionali, include: reception centres for refugees and asylum 
seekers, temporary reception centres for other migrants, and centres 
for identification and expulsion. Alongside these are the various shel-
ters for victims of trafficking and reception centres for unaccompanied 
migrant children. In effect the Centri Polifunzionali is a centralised 
depot where a variety of migrant groups are made invisible and con-
trollable. The same migrants are, at the same time, used as an army of 
cheap workers in agriculture, in private households, and other sectors, 
labouring to keep Italy’s slack economy going. 
Mussolini’s anti-urban law was abolished in 1961 following the joint 
role of a strong labour movement and of the Communist Party. Yet, 
the Duce would be proud to learn that it never stops inspiring Italian 
rulers in creating a class of non-resident exploitable workers. 
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Rethinking (im)mobilities of Roma in Europe
Roma are wrongly assumed to have a cultural predilection to move. Most 
Roma do not migrate, and many of their largest movements have been 
forced upon them.
Julija Sardelić
In recent months there has been a great deal of discussion about forced 
migration and the distinction between who is a refugee and who is an 
economic migrant. In the case of people fleeing from Syria, the media 
discourse has changed significantly: many news outlets now refer to 
them exclusively as refugees. Yet while this is an important change, it 
has latently reinforced the dominant dichotomy of refugees, who ‘le-
gitimately’ seek protection, and ‘undeserving economic migrants’, who 
do not since they are presumably mobile ‘by choice’. European Roma, 
who are often portrayed as social benefit tourists in the media, have 
long served as a stereotypical example of the undeserving economic 
migrant. However, much like those crossing the Mediterranean now, 
the degree to which the movement of European Roma has been ‘free’ 
is open to debate. 
Fear of invasion
The Free Movement of EU Citizens Directive (Directive 2004/38/EC) 
came into force on 30 April 2004, one day before the so-called ‘Big 
Bang EU Enlargement’ that created ten new EU member states from 
mostly post-socialist candidate countries. This directive permits all EU 
citizens to move to and reside in member states other than their own 
for up to three months. However, over the past decade—particularly 
after Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU in 2007—we have witnessed 
heated media and political debates on whether this right should re-
main unconditional. The primary impetus for this discord has been 
the position of Romani EU citizens, who move freely between their 
own post-socialist country (usually Romania) and countries in West-
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ern Europe (e.g. France, Italy, Spain, and the UK).
The issue of ‘Romani mobilities’ has been framed by three popular 
beliefs. First, Roma are presumed to have a ‘nomadic’ culture. Sec-
ond, the mobility of Roma in socialist states was stopped or severe-
ly restrained by the local and state authorities. Third, now that those 
restraints on mobility have been removed—a result of the fall of the 
Iron Curtain, as well as the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements—Roma 
have resumed their ‘traditional’ movement. Some believe that this will 
eventually result in mass migration to Western Europe with Romani 
migrants ‘stealing’ jobs and taking advantage of social welfare pro-
grammes. Although the fear of ‘West Romani invasion’ was proven to 
be unfounded, the myth that it might happen in the future fuels many 
popular media broadcasts such as the British reality show ‘The Roma-
nians are coming’.
Mobile, but not of their own volition
This empirical reality forces us to not only ask why the free mobili-
ty debate revolves around Roma, who are EU citizens, but also why 
Roma are assumed to be more mobile than other populations. Indeed, 
history shows that the movement of Roma is more a product of their 
treatment at the hands of different authorities than of culture, and it is 
an open question whether they would be mobile if contemporary and 
historical contexts had been different.
Roma were viewed as bad omens in many folk cultures during the Ot-
toman period, especially during times of war. When a group of Roma 
was seen coming to a village, it was said, the Ottoman army could not 
be far behind. Authorities dealt differently with these ‘Roma nomads’. 
The city of Bamberg (now in Germany) was recorded as paying them 
a certain amount of money to leave in 1463, while a decree issued in 
1697 in what is today’s Slovakia declared all Roma to be outlaws and 
instructed the authorities to expel or hang them. 
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Ironically, the mobility of Roma actually reached its peak during the 
second world war, in which many Roma suffered the same fate as Jews. 
Romani survivors that I met in different states of the former Yugosla-
via told me stories of Romani settlements and villages that were almost 
completely emptied. Up to 90 percent of the Romani population in 
many countries disappeared, taken out of their settlements and either 
massacred on the spot or shipped by train to Auschwitz-Birkenau, 
Jasenovac, and other concentration camps. For most, this meant inevi-
table death. Ironically, such periods of forced, brutal mobility inflicted 
upon Roma by others in Europe do not attract much attention. 
Moreover, it is well known that the authorities of the socialist govern-
ments curtailed the movement rights of Roma in the post-war period. 
What is less known is that prior to this, the authorities relocated large 
numbers of Roma so that they would not be concentrated in one place. 
For example, most of the Roma in the nominally socialist Czechoslo-
vakia lived in the Slovak part since those residing on Czech lands were 
killed during the war. Many of these were relocated from the former to 
the latter to man the factories being built in Czech areas, yet remained 
registered as republican citizens of Slovakia. After the dissolution of 
Czechoslovakia, this ‘geographical mobility’ (conducted by the state 
authorities) was the main reason why around 25,000 Roma living in 
the Czech Republic had difficulties accessing Czech citizenship and 
were rendered de facto stateless. 
Various patterns of Romani (im)mobilities
While these examples demonstrate that governments directly or in-
directly caused many of the largest movements of Roma in history, 
it is also apparent that the contemporary treatment of Roma by state 
authorities continues to push them to move. Here we can think of the 
eviction and resettlement of Roma communities in several west Eu-
ropean states, or be reminded of Roma and other Romani minorities 
(Ashkali and Egyptians, for example) who fled states of the former 
Yugoslavia due to war. Those who left to other parts of Europe were 
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usually not granted refugee status. They were put under temporary 
protection, a status that made them eligible for deportation once the 
violence was declared over. 
At the same time, large, seemingly more regular mobilities do not at-
tract much attention. For example, an extremely large proportion of 
the Romani population in Slovenia commutes on a daily basis to the 
neighbouring country of Austria. These workers, who are unable to 
find jobs in Slovenia due to the economic situation and discrimina-
tion, are treated as other ‘gastarbeiters’ (guestworkers) in Austria. A 
similar situation exists for the many Bulgarian Roma working as sea-
sonal labourers in Greece. 
It must also be noted that not all Roma have the ability to move. In 
today’s Europe, a large number of Romani individuals do not possess 
basic documents, even birth certificates. This lack of paperwork makes 
them legally invisible and de facto stateless. Most such individuals lack 
the resources to be mobile, and by most estimates the number of sed-
entary Roma far outweighs the mobile Romani population. 
Why some Roma become migrants is not fully understood. However, 
there are other, far more urgent questions for which we must demand 
answers: why do most Roma in Europe, whether migrants or not, re-
main so immobile on the socio-economic ladder? Why do they exist 
on the edge of poverty in most societies, and why are they one of the 
main targets of hate crimes and discrimination? More generally, is it 
correct to describe only those fleeing war and achieving refugee status 
as ‘forced migrants’, or should the old dichotomies of forced and mi-
gration by choice be reconceptualised?

Section two
The consequences of mobility 
controls
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Families in detention
The United States uses the detention of families and unaccompanied 
minors as a method of deterring immigration. This must stop.
Roxanne Lynn Doty
A recent report from the Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service 
and the Women’s Refugee Commission tells the story of 28-year-old 
Rosa, who fled the gang violence in Honduras with her seven-year-old 
daughter Ana. They were arrested in New Mexico and put into a fam-
ily detention centre there for three months. Around this same time, 
mothers held with their children at another family detention centre 
in Texas went on a five-day hunger strike the week before Easter 2015. 
The stories of these women and their children are among the many 
stories that have resulted from the United States’ renewed practice of 
detaining immigrant families.
The number of individuals detained in the United States for immi-
gration reasons has increased dramatically over the past few decades, 
and especially under the Obama administration. This situation stems 
from the intensified border control efforts and immigration policies 
that ostensibly aim to reduce mobility along the southern border of the 
United States. The policies have utterly failed to do so and have, rather, 
increased the vulnerability of those who cross. Amongst the numerous 
situations of detention that highlight the inhumanity of the current 
system is the issue of family detention.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) utilises a network of 
over 300 detention centres nationwide, many of them owned and 
operated by private corporations. In December of 2014 the largest 
family detention centre for immigrants opened in Dilley, Texas. At the 
facility’s inauguration, Jeh Johnson, the secretary of the Department 
of Homeland Security, said ominously that with the added detention 
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capability, “It’ll now be more likely that you’ll be detained and sent 
back”. The centre is a former camp for oilfield workers located 100 
miles north of the US–Mexico border, between Laredo and San Anto-
nio. It is designed to hold about 2,400 detainees, most of whom will be 
women and children. The 50-acre site will be managed by Corrections 
Corporation of America (CCA), the largest for-profit prison corpora-
tion in the United States. CCA describes its mission in Dilley as being 
“to provide an open, safe environment with residential housing as well 
as educational opportunities for women and children who are awaiting 
their due process.” Others have described the site as “standing on a dirt 
road lined with cabins in a barren compound enclosed by fencing.”
The event precipitating the recent uptick in what has been referred 
to as “Obama’s family deportation mill” was the arrival of the ‘border 
kids’ during the summer of 2014. Tens of thousands of unaccompa-
nied minors from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras crossed the 
Mexican border into the United States. While these unaccompanied 
minors received most of the media attention, there was also a signif-
Otay Detention Center. Nina Robinson for BBC World Service/Flickr. 
Creative Commons.
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icant increase in the number of women and children crossing for the 
same reasons, namely violence in their home countries. The US gov-
ernment apprehended 68,334 family members at the US’s southwest 
border between October 2013 and September 2014. This represents a 
361 percent increase from the previous year, according to the report 
mentioned in the first paragraph.
Prior to the summer of 2014, ICE maintained only one family deten-
tion centre: the 96-bed Berks County Residential Center in Leesport, 
Pennsylvania, which opened in 2001. From 2006-2009 CAA, under 
contract with ICE, managed a family detention centre in Taylor, Texas. 
However, it was shut down after scathing publicity regarding the con-
ditions at the centre led to a human rights investigation and a lawsuit 
from the American Civil Liberties Union. Two other centres, one in 
Artesia, New Mexico and one in Karnes County, Texas were opened 
temporarily to hold families. Prior to opening the new centre in Dilley, 
Texas family detention, which was a very controversial aspect of the 
immigrant detention system, had been on the decline.  
Etienne Balibar has written of a “topography of cruelty” in which asy-
lum and migration are central aspects. Borders, key features of this 
topography, work as instruments of security control, segregation and 
“unequal access to the means of existence”. Surely, the detention of 
families, many with very young children, constitutes an extreme form 
of cruelty? Confining children in compounds behind razor wire is in-
herently inhumane. The average age of the children held at the Artesia, 
New Mexico detention centre was six years old. Mental health profes-
sional and immigration lawyers speak of the damage that prolonged 
detention does to mothers and their children, most of whom have 
already experienced devastating forms of violence. Surely the United 
States can do better.
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Slave state: how UK immigration controls create 
‘slaves’
British immigration controls are not working and policies stripping rights 
from large numbers of migrants are creating a ‘slave’ population.
Lucy Williams
The term ‘modern slavery’ is used to describe the terrible reality of 
some people’s lives, but it is used selectively. Stories of slavery today 
tend to focus on an ‘evil’ perpetrator and often offer fetishistic descrip-
tions of bondage while neglecting the processes that allow one group 
of people to dominate another. Historically, chattel slavery has meant 
much more than the simple ownership of one person by another. To 
get to the heart of slavery, we must move beyond images of chains 
and frightened faces and look at how people become victimised and 
stripped of their humanity. 
Slaves are institutionally powerless and perpetually dependent in a ca-
pricious world. They are obliged to abide by laws that don’t protect or 
benefit them, existing in a liminal state between a lost social place and 
new communities and identities. Slaves are ‘marked’ as different and, 
as people without rights, can lawfully be rejected and abused. They are 
not free to make their own choices or work towards their own goals. In 
declaring many migrants in the UK ‘illegal’ and ‘deportable’—refusing 
them permission to work, to rent or even to marry—the state has de-
clared them ‘unwanted’ and without personal rights. 
Migrants who have lost or been refused leave to remain in the UK 
are liable to detention, destitution, and deportation. Many have been 
living in the UK as students, visitors, workers, and members of settled 
families but have lost their rights for a variety of reasons. Their visas 
may have run out or policy changes may have re-branded them as un-
documented or irregular. Some may have been asylum seekers refused 
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refugee status, or perhaps they have had their temporary protections 
withdrawn. Some might have been convicted of criminal offences car-
rying more than a year’s sentence which, since 2008, has meant auto-
matic deportation. Some may have lived in the UK for most of their 
lives, embedded in communities where they feel, and are accepted as, 
‘British’. For all of them, a Home Office decision denying further right 
to remain means that they become effectively banished to the fringes 
of society. 
Many migrants in the UK today experience the restraints on freedom 
that academics have linked to slavery. They are not ‘owned’ and they 
do not necessarily work unrewarded for the gain of others, yet without 
rights to support themselves legally and with the threat of detention 
and deportation hanging over them, they are marked as aliens with no 
chance to belong. 
Immigration detention in the UK is administrative—meaning it results 
People protest the Yarl’s Wood detention and immigration removal centre located 
in Bedfordshire, UK, in August 2015. Darren Johnson for iDJ Photography/Flickr. 
Creative Commons.
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from a bureaucratic rather than a judicial procedure—and indefinite. 
Drawing on many studies, the recent All Party Parliamentary Inquiry 
described the damage detention can inflict on already vulnerable peo-
ple. Detention is promoted as a means of facilitating deportation but, 
despite the rhetoric, recent official figures show that only 53 percent of 
detainees leave detention for their countries of origin. 
Many migrants are released from detention into a British commu-
nity, put under curfew, and monitored by electronic tag. They must 
often live at specified addresses and almost all will have to report to 
Immigration Reporting Centres, from where they can be re-detained 
without warning. If eligible for ‘Section 4 support’ (Immigration Act 
1999), they receive no-choice accommodation and an ‘Azure’ card, a 
cashless, pre-paid card, worth £36.62 per week in designated shops. 
Through tags and the Azure card, some 5,000 migrants on Section 4 
are surveilled and monitored. Self-reporting requires migrants to sub-
mit themselves to further monitoring and also saves the Home Office 
the trouble of rounding up potential deportees. In other words, deten-
tion is not the end of many migrants’ stories in the UK. It remains a 
constant threat even after they have been ‘released’ into the communi-
ty, and some people are detained and released many times before they 
are removed.
The pain of this contingent situation is evident from the testimony of 
Said, a Middle Eastern man released after 20 months in detention:
… I’m not allowed to work and I am reporting every three 
months … and believe me when I go I know they can de-
tain me anytime—they can detain me forever … so I will be 
in the same circle—if this happens again I don’t know … I 
thought of finishing my life, to end this suffering…
Consider the experience of Abdul, a young Afghan who was in local 
authority care as an asylum-seeking child and who worked hard to 
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integrate into British life. Refused asylum as an adult, he is not only 
rejected as ‘one of us’ but subject to clumsy attempts at deportation to 
a country he knows little about and where he fears persecution and 
death.
… we are not sleeping at night. We don’t know what to do 
with our life ‘cos we haven’t got nothing. We can’t work we 
can’t go to college. What we can do—I’m just going to kill 
myself (bangs table) it’s really bad—it’s really difficult to 
think about this stuff.
This is the ‘hostile environment’ that Theresa May boasts she has cre-
ated for ‘illegal’ migrants. Living under threat of detention, destitution 
and deportation, the migrant is ‘everywhere in chains’—chains repre-
sented by Section 4 ‘support’, tagging, reporting, raids, illegal employ-
ment, and a lack of recourse to the law or protection from abuse.
Excluding a group because of their place of birth and heritage is as 
unethical as stripping rights from any group without the possibility of 
reprieve or redemption. The privatisation of the control of migrants, 
and with it reliance on remote methods of surveillance, brings further 
concerns. The same companies that profit from the detention, depor-
tation, and warehousing of migrants are bidding to run prisons and 
other formerly public functions. Not only do they profit from keeping 
people in the system and by failing to resolve cases, they also distance 
the British government from the messy end of immigration control. 
As even citizenship in the UK becomes contingent, we should all fight 
for the rights of people already defined by their lack of rights and their 
enslavement by the state.
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The UK: the far shore for torture survivors
The relatively small number of torture survivors who make it to the UK 
face disbelief, the threat of detention and removal, and barriers of access 
to vital services.
Rhian Beynon
The world is currently seeing one of the biggest displacements of peo-
ple of all time, driven by conflict, humanitarian crises, and human 
rights violations, particularly in the Middle East and Africa. Accord-
ing to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the top 
refugee-producing countries are Syria and Afghanistan, followed by 
Somalia, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Myan-
mar.
It is safe to assume that a significant proportion of the estimated 16.7 
million refugees in the world today have suffered torture, given the 
well-documented violence of state and non-state actors operating 
within top refugee-producing states. Indeed, the DRC, South Sudan, 
Afghanistan and other top refugee-producing states are the countries 
of origin for many of the more than 1,000 torture survivors referred to 
Freedom from Torture in the UK each year. 
The survivors of torture who are referred to Freedom from Torture 
originate from some 80 countries around the world. Not all of these 
countries suffer from the intense humanitarian crises that would bring 
them within the mandate of the UNHCR, such as Iran. Regardless, 
most arrive at Freedom from Torture traumatised, vulnerable because 
of their experiences, and fearing further persecution. They have a right 
to rehabilitation under the UN Convention Against Torture. 
Most survivors of torture, however, do not make it to the UK. They 
remain within their geographic region, hosted by countries such as 
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Pakistan, Lebanon, Jordan, Chad, Ethiopia, and Kenya. These are, 
by and large, less wealthy countries with little to offer in the way of 
security and specialist support to individuals traumatised and made 
vulnerable by torture. Survivors of torture in these countries have little 
hope of fleeing to Europe in order to access the support of a charity like 
Freedom from Torture. This is because formal schemes for proactively 
assisting refugees to enter the UK—be they torture survivors or not—
help shockingly low numbers relative to the scale of the displacement. 
Resettlement programmes in the UK
The Gateway Protection Programme and the Mandate Refugee Pro-
gramme are the UK’s official programmes for resettling refugees cov-
ered by the UNHCR mandate. Palestine refugees are the most notable 
group outside this mandate. In January 2014, the UK announced a 
new vulnerable person relocation scheme (VPRS) in response to the 
Syrian crisis. 
Resettlement programmes like Gateway and VPRS offer important 
routes to protection in the UK. It is not possible to make an application 
for asylum from outside the UK, and those fleeing torture often lack 
the documents, visas, and monies needed to travel to and enter the 
UK. Humanitarian crises also inhibit travel to a functioning British 
Embassy so as to make a visa application. Even if one finds a way to 
apply, there is no guarantee that a visa will be forthcoming.
Despite resettlement’s importance as a safe and legal access route for 
refugees, Gateway has brought just 5,500 refugees to the UK over the 
past decade. VPRS, despite the nearly four million Syrians currently 
registered with UNHCR in Syria’s neighbouring countries, has reset-
tled only 187 people in the UK since it began. The UK’s response has 
instead focused on financing refugee response programmes in the re-
gion itself. It has spent more than £800 million ($1.2 billion) on the 
crisis since 2011 and is among the top three donors. 
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The upshot of all this was that in 2014, the year UNHCR declared the 
global population of displaced people to be above 50 million people 
for the first time since World War II, the UK resettled just 787 refugees. 
The general picture is that resettlement programmes cannot be relied 
on for most of those who come within the UNHCR mandate. They 
are not an option at all for those torture survivors who fall outside the 
mandate because they are in countries that are repressive rather than 
in outright humanitarian crisis.
If their family has financial resources, if local circumstances permit, 
and a if visa application succeeds, a torture survivor may be able to 
travel in an immigration category, for example as a student to the UK. 
But many others with no documentation will run the gauntlet of the 
Mediterranean crossing and European port officials to claim asylum.
Asylum in the UK
The UK saw just 24,914 applicants for asylum in 2014, and 59 percent 
of these were refused on the first decision (although some 28 percent 
of appeals against asylum decisions succeeded). Eurostat figures sug-
gest asylum applications in the UK constitute a mere 5.5 percent of the 
total number of applications lodged in the EU28 (Eurostat).
The majority of those in immigration detention in Britain today are 
asylum seekers. A significant number of individuals are placed into 
detention as soon as they file for asylum, their application ‘fast tracked’ 
to remove those deemed ineligible as soon as possible. It is a system 
notorious for hampering asylum claimants’ access to careful legal ad-
vice and for making it difficult for survivors to disclose upsetting case 
histories, for example torture and other forms of intimate violence. 
Home Office policy states that survivors of torture and certain other 
vulnerable groups should not be held in immigration detention. If they 
are assessed to be a victim of torture while in detention they should be 
released under Rule 35 of the Detention Centre Rules. Rule 35 also re-
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quires medical practitioners in immigration removal centres to report 
all individuals they consider to be victims of torture, who may then be 
eligible for release. However, Freedom from Torture has known many 
survivors who have been detained, and once individuals are detained 
Rule 35 reports are extremely ineffective in ensuring their release. 
For torture survivors who find a way to live within the UK communi-
ty—either as refugees, as asylum seekers with ongoing applications, or 
as refused asylum seekers—life is a continuing challenge. The constant 
threats of detention and removal hang over many. Work is generally 
prohibited for those with an asylum seeker status, and welfare support 
keeps survivors in poverty, impeding their rehabilitation from trauma. 
NHS services, while theoretically available to torture survivors, are in 
practice often denied or are not, in most circumstances, sufficient to 
meet the needs of their recovery. 
The 1951 Refugee Convention and much of our modern international 
human rights framework were the result of learning from the impact 
of  human rights atrocities on European victims during world war II. It 
is a dreadful irony that while a massive displacement of people is tak-
ing place today for similar reasons elsewhere in the world, European 
countries like the UK are making it so difficult for the victims to obtain 
the protection and support to which they have a right. 
Despite the UK’s opposition to any mandatory EU quota system in 
response to the humanitarian crisis in the Mediterranean Sea, there is 
nothing to stop the prime minister from making a voluntary pledge to 
increase the pitiful numbers of refugees offered sanctuary under the 
UK’s settlement programmes.
facebook.com/BTSoD • 49
Migration and Mobility
Slavery, asylum, and the face of social death in 
modern day Britain
The dehumanisation of transatlantic slaves has strong echoes in the UK’s 
current immigration regime, which separates families, denies parents 
custodial rights over children, and condemns migrants to social death.
Roda Madziva
Announcing the publication of her draft Modern Slavery Bill in 2013, 
British Home Secretary Theresa May wrote, “Traffickers and slave 
masters exploit whatever means they have at their disposal to coerce, 
deceive and force individuals into a life of abuse, servitude and inhu-
mane treatment. This is simply unacceptable in modern day Britain”.
Talk of slave masters calls to mind transatlantic slavery, an inhumane 
system that not only treated human beings as objects of property and 
authorised their violent control, but also tore the enslaved from their 
kin and community, wrenched apart husbands and wives, parents and 
children, and stripped them of independence, power, honour and dig-
nity. As sociologist Orlando Patterson famously put it, the enslaved 
were biologically alive yet socially dead. Is the treatment of some 
human beings as socially dead “simply unacceptable in modern day 
Britain”? My research with Zimbabwean asylum seekers in the UK 
suggests that it is not.
Like many asylum seekers escaping politically repressive regimes, 
my Zimbabwean interviewees were parents who had not managed to 
bring their children with them when they escaped to the UK. They 
imagined that, once in a safe haven, they would be able to arrange for 
their children to join them. Yet on arrival, they discovered that the UK 
asylum system treats parents as asylum seekers first and parents later 
(if ever). As a result, many parents are forced to endure separation 
from their children against their will as they struggle through the long 
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and torturous process of asylum claims and appeals. As one 45-year-
old father of two told me:
My children have had these eight years of loneliness… I 
dread phoning home—calling home has long ceased to be 
a joy to me… I have failed them, forced into living in exile 
due to the circumstances.
In addition to separating families, asylum policies deny parents the 
right to protect and support their children even from a distance. The 
Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 withdrew asylum seekers’ rights to 
engage in paid work, a decision made on the basis of the unsubstanti-
ated claim that such a right encouraged ‘bogus’ asylum claims from so-
called ‘economic migrants’. For asylum seekers who have had to travel 
alone, to be refused this right is to become entirely helpless in the face 
of their children’s often desperate need for financial assistance. To be 
granted partial rights—that is, the right to continue to live and breathe 
but not the right to legally belong, to family life, to freely sell one’s 
labour power, or to support one’s children from afar—looks very much 
like a condition of social death. In the words of one asylum-seeking 
mother separated from her children:
Without a job … and a family I have lost my self-worth … 
My situation is no longer an immigration issue … it is now 
a death sentence … I am in a prison with invisible walls … 
It is a state worse than death itself.
The story of Sukai
The same sentiment was even more forcefully expressed by Sukai (not 
her real name), whose son died in Zimbabwe while she was in the UK 
waiting for her asylum appeal to be settled, and trying to find a way to 
bring him over as well. As an asylum seeker, she could not even return 
home to bury him. Sukai was subsequently granted leave to remain, 
but the judge’s decision on her case was then contested by the Home 
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Office. As a result she was evicted from her National Asylum Support 
Service (NASS) accommodation, and left homeless, destitute, disen-
franchised, bereaved, and in extremely poor health.
The wrongness of ‘trafficking’ is said to be that human beings are iso-
lated, immobilised, forced to work without pay, locked into dependen-
cy with ‘traffickers’ who physically or psychologically abuse them. Vic-
tims of ‘trafficking’ are dehumanised and rendered powerless, and the 
individuals who directly perpetrate crimes against them—the ‘traffick-
ers’ and ‘slave masters’ that Home Secretary May’s recently passed “his-
toric” Modern Slavery Act 2015 will supposedly punish—have faces. 
But what of those who subject asylum seekers to what they themselves 
describe as a ‘living death’?
In grief and desperation, Sukai once went in person to the Home Of-
fice department in Croydon that was dealing with her case. She hoped 
that she would be able to speak face to face with the person who ex-
Martin Deutsch /Flickr. Creative Commons.
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erted such total control over her life to such devastating effect. But, 
she explained, she was just directed from one office to another, and 
nobody working there admitted to holding the power over her fate. “I 
was told that the Home Office is a system and not a person,” she said. 
The facelessness of the power of the state intensified her experience of 
powerlessness:
If the Home Office was a person, I could have demand-
ed to see him or her. I would have wanted even to go to 
where he or she lives and cry out all my anger. I would have 
demanded to see how ugly and inhumane this creature is. 
Unfortunately, you cannot get to sit down with this thing 
called the ‘system’ and have a one-on-one talk explaining 
exactly what you are going through, asking ‘Can you please 
do something about it?’
Asylum seekers are not forced to surrender to the will of another 
human being. Yet their capacity to exercise personal autonomy, or to 
assert their will to influence even the most fundamental aspects of 
their lives and those of their children, is so severely restricted that it 
appears as a modern form of social death. Why is this acceptable in 
modern day Britain? 
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At any cost: the injustice of the “4 and 4 rule” in 
Canada
Immigration rules in Canada are forcing out already-vulnerable temporary 
foreign workers. The measure’s class dimensions are representative of 
the injustice of Canada’s revolving-door system of labour exploitation.
Stephanie J. Silverman
Tens of thousands of law-abiding foreign workers residing in Canada 
became deportable in April 2015. This sudden vulnerability to depor-
tation resulted from the parliamentary passage of a small legislative 
change called the “cumulative duration rule”, known colloquially as the 
“4 in, 4 out” or the “4 and 4 Rule”. Under this rule, non-citizens work-
ing on temporary labour visas for four years who had not transitioned 
to permanent resident status must leave the country for four years—or 
transfer to visitor or student status—before applying to return. 
What this means for children depends on where they were born. Ca-
nadian-born children have Canadian citizenship and can stay, while 
their non-citizen parents must leave; foreign-born children have been 
asked to quit school and leave. Either way, their parents who have not 
successfully transitioned to permanent resident status are being faced 
with the tasks of packing up their (working) lives, including their tax 
rebates, unpaid wages, and Canadian pension plan contributions in a 
short timeframe. 
The 4 and 4 Rule may be the federal government’s reply to mount-
ing criticisms that too many people are gaining admission to Canada 
through temporary labour migration programmes. While Canada has 
adopted and run such programmes since the 1960s, the government 
has come under fire more recently from opposition groups who argue 
that these programmes siphon jobs from Canadians hard-pressed to 
find employment in this tough economy. Although industry, by and 
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large, supports temporary labour migration, the unions are mixed. Gil 
McGowan from the Alberta Federation of Labour, for example, says 
that these programmes provide “a cover for providing employers with 
a mechanism that keep wages low when economic conditions suggest 
that they should go up. The programme needs to go.” Partially in re-
sponse, the Canadian federal government seems to be retrenching the 
revolving door of exploitable labour through measures such as the 4 
and 4 Rule. 
Foreign workers in Canada
As Luin Goldring and Patricia Landolt argue, there are essentially two 
tracks for migrant workers arriving in Canada: ‘immigrants’ (under-
stood as workers and long-term settlers) versus ‘temporary residents’ 
(differing reasons for entry but allowed only short-term periods of 
residence). Independent yet bounded, the entry tracks “lead workers 
along separate paths, into distinct labour market segments, and sort 
them into future citizens and noncitizens. Temporary residents are 
only temporary: their path leads them to leave Canada and go ‘back 
home,’ perhaps to return but again on a temporary basis”.
As the number of temporary labour migrants has grown over the last 
decade, so too has confusion over the programmes under which they 
are admitted to Canada. In addition to categories such as working hol-
iday programmes, the three main streams are the Seasonal Agricultur-
al Workers Program (SAWP), the Live-in Caregivers Program (LICP), 
and the Temporary Foreign Workers Programme (TFWP). As the 
oldest, the SAWP was started in 1966 as a bilateral agreement with Ja-
maica. Management of SAWP was privatised in 1987 and placed under 
the control of Foreign Agricultural Resource Management Services 
(FARMS). Since SAWP is designed as a circular migration programme 
with lower-skilled workers leaving Canada after eight months, its en-
rolees were largely unaffected by the 4 and 4 Rule. The LICP is a unique 
two-step programme to employ (female) workers as domestic caregiv-
ers in exchange for a pathway to citizenship. Reformulated in 1992, the 
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LICP opened a pathway to apply for permanent residence, but only 
after enrolees completed two years of live-in domestic service in the 
private household of their charges/employers. While the government 
changed the LICP in 2014 to withdraw the live-in requirement, the 
caregiver is still bonded to her employer in significant ways. LICP 
caregivers admitted under the pre-2014 changes are not subject to de-
portation orders under the 4 and 4 Rule.
With the highest public profile in Canada, the final programme, the 
TFWP, is plagued by pernicious misunderstandings of its operations. 
A stop-gap solution meant to fill acute labour shortages, the TFWP is, 
according to an article from the Financial Post, “intended as a last-re-
sort, short-term solution so businesses can continue to grow and cre-
ate more opportunities for Canadians”. Jason Foster has tracked the 
de-skilling of the TFWP: whereas a majority of TFWP enrolees in 
2000 were higher-skilled, by 2008 the lower-skilled occupations had 
become the largest category. With its growth from about 100,000 en-
rolees in 2002 to as many as 338,000 in 2014, it follows that there is a 
diverse list of employers looking to hire TFWs.  
The expansion of the TFWP in an age of austerity has attracted a swell 
of attention and made it a stand-in for all things to do with foreign 
workers. Public debate and discord ranged from partisan mud-sling-
ing in the federal parliament to angry locals claiming that their jobs 
were swiped. A major bank’s hiring (higher-skilled) TFWP enrolees to 
replace local employees was greeted by a large enough storm of con-
troversy that the bank felt compelled to issue a public apology. General 
coverage in the media ranged from sympathy with the workers over 
unpaid wages and dirty working conditions to resentment that they 
were allowed to come during a period of high unemployment, often 
in the same article.  
Enter the 4 and 4 Rule
This snapshot illustrates the complex background against which the 
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problematic 4 and 4 Rule is being implemented. Apart from the clear 
xenophobic issues, there are worrying class dimensions to the selec-
tion of 4 and 4 Rule targets. To begin with, the high recruitment, air-
fare, and other fees associated with signing up can lead to a situation 
of de facto  debt bondage for TFWP enrolees as they work off these 
‘loans’. Second, the 4 and 4 Rule applies to people labouring in the 
lower-skilled TFWP industries, such as retail, hospitality, and manu-
facturing. The Canadian government has formally exempted the small 
minority of workers employed in management and professional ca-
pacities as well as their spouses and dependants. In fact, there is an 
option to apply for expedited permanent status under the Canadian 
Experience Class that is available exclusively to these higher-skilled 
“immigrants”, to use Goldring and Landolt’s helpful phraseology. Such 
immigrants will be spared the decision of whether to leave their chil-
dren in Canada because their pathways to permanent residence have 
been cancelled. Delphine Nakache also points out that, if the govern-
ment is truly concerned with labour shortages, wouldn’t it make more 
sense to place temporal limits on the employer’s use of the programme 
and not on the migrants themselves?
The 4 and 4 Rule is an instantiation of unjust and unequal treatment 
based on class and labour qualifications. While higher-skilled mi-
grants are walking the path to permanent residence, and LICP domes-
tic workers are still citizens-in-waiting, the majority of TFWP enrolees 
in Canada have been consigned to a fate of return or removal. The 4 
and 4 Rule is propping open the revolving door, and pushing out those 
people deemed to be disposable workers.
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New mobility regimes, new forms of exploitation 
in Sicily
Asylum seekers, refugees, and poor EU citizens are vulnerable to labour 
exploitation in EU member states. Sicily’s agricultural sector illuminates 
how structural gaps and individual needs exacerbate that vulnerability.
Letizia Palumbo and Alessandra Sciurba
The thousands of migrants and refugees making their way to Europe 
today are, tragically, discussed mainly in terms of death rates, drown-
ings, and possible responses. What is much less discussed is what 
happens to those that make it past the border guards and onto the 
European continent. Many such individuals join the ranks of Europe’s 
exploitable labour force and begin to work alongside their poor EU 
counterparts in many labour sectors such as agriculture. Their vul-
nerability, which is not sufficiently addressed by either European or 
national policies, derives in part from the new mobility regimes that 
mark current migratory patterns.
The economic crisis has significantly changed the composition of mi-
grants moving to and within Europe. The lack of concrete and realis-
tic opportunities has discouraged non-EU ‘economic’ migrants from 
making their way across the common external border, especially if 
their traditional country of destination has been strongly affected by 
the crisis. As a result, the main protagonists of the current migratory 
movements are refugees and EU citizens. The latter are predominantly 
Romanian citizens who have been ‘pushed out’ by the ever-widening 
gap between the cost of living and the average salary. 
Sicily’s agricultural labourers come from both these groups. Individ-
uals from sub-Saharan countries, many of whom are asylum seekers 
and refugees, work largely on the western parts of the island near Tra-
pani, while Romanians dominate in the east in the areas of Ragusa. 
58 • opendemocracy.net/beyondslavery
Beyond Trafficking and Slavery
In both these cases, irrespective of their legal status, migrant workers 
are subjected to serious labour exploitation and maltreatment. It is 
worth mentioning here that many Romanian agricultural labourers 
are women, and as such are particularly vulnerable to sexual as well as 
labour exploitation. 
Different mobility, same exploitation
A comparison of the geographical areas of Ragusa and Trapani shows 
how different forms and degrees of mobility (due to the specific legal 
status) interact with individual needs and life projects to produce a 
complex system of exploitation.
The case of Ragusa reveals that migrant EU citizens are as vulnerable 
as their non-EU co-workers in Sicilian agriculture. Indeed, their pos-
sibility of moving with no restrictions across EU boundaries does not 
translate into real access to rights and social justice. In addition, Ro-
manians, who often work abroad in order to remit money back home, 
rarely consider Italy as a country in which they can build their future. 
It is merely a temporary place of employment, and as such many feel 
that even abusive conditions can be tolerated. This acquiescence, a 
product of Romanian labourers’ transience, is one reason why local 
employers have largely replaced their Tunisian workforce of the 1970s 
with Romanian labourers. The Tunisian migrants of 40 years ago large-
ly came to Europe to stay, and their planned permanence compelled 
them to bargain for more equitable working conditions.
In contrast, the exploitation occurring in the area of Trapani highlights 
how the restricted mobility of asylum seekers and refugees exacerbates 
the vulnerability of an already vulnerable group. The imposition to 
stay in Italy as the first country of arrival (EU Regulation 64/2013), 
the slowness of asylum procedures in Italy, and the lack of adequate 
hosting and protection mechanisms for asylum seekers have the com-
bined effect of forcing asylum seekers to accept any job opportunity 
they can find.
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New migration patterns and forms of mobility, together with restric-
tions in access to rights, thus play a fundamental role in aggravating 
the vulnerability of asylum seekers, refugees, and poor EU citizens. 
The contemporary labour market systemically takes advantage of this 
vulnerability, especially in sectors such as agriculture, which rely on 
labour segmentation and a cheap, flexible labour force. 
Combating exploitation by grasping structural factors
The Sicilian context thus offers us a privileged perspective to evaluate 
EU and national policies on the exploitation of migrant labour. The 
principal aims of institutional interventions to date have been to pre-
vent irregular migration and to regulate gangmasters. The focus, how-
ever, has been strongly on preventing irregular migration, resulting in 
the lack of adequate protection for both regular and irregular migrants 
and the relative impunity of exploitative employers. This approach 
appears to be even more inadequate if we consider that today the ma-
jority of exploited migrants are not irregular. Moreover, by employing 
refugees and EU citizens, exploitative employers avoid being accused 
of facilitating and exploitating irregular migration.
The only way to combat current forms of labour exploitation in Sic-
ily, as well as in other contexts, is to move from a merely repressive 
approach to one that is rights-based and capable of tackling the struc-
tural factors that create the current vulnerability of migrants. The most 
pressing issues to address are: the restricted regimes of mobility af-
fecting, particularly, asylum seekers; the labour market segmentation 
on the basis of gender, nationality and legal status; and the lack of real 
access to rights and justice for all migrants.
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No agency: laying the groundwork to exploit 
migrant workers
There are many tragic stories highlighting the abuse and exploitation of 
Singapore’s migrant workers. Underlying them all is a structural problem: 
workers’ inability to speak for themselves and be respected as individuals.
Kirsten Han
Singapore has seen a growth spurt in the past two decades. The skyline 
of 1990 was already impressive for a city-state built on granite rock at 
the tip of the Malay Peninsula, but looks doddery and old-fashioned 
when contrasted with today’s shiny, lit-up spectacle. The Marina Bay 
Sands with its infinity pool—in which Katy Perry famously held a 
press conference—now takes pride of place, and even has the largest 
light and water show in Asia every day to get your attention.
None of this would have been possible without the massive numbers 
of migrant workers in Singapore who clean streets and homes, serve 
food and drink, and work on construction sites and shipyards. As of 
June 2014, there are 980,800 migrants on work permits in Singapore, 
a city-state with a total population of 5.4 million. Of these, 321,200 
work in construction, while 218,300 are women working as foreign 
domestic workers (FDW). Migrant workers thus constitute a signifi-
cant portion of the island’s population, yet they are Singapore’s most 
exploited group of residents.
There are many factors that contribute to the exploitation, domination, 
and abuse of these workers, but it is their structural lack of agency that 
lays the foundation. This exists in part because migrants must often 
pay exorbitant sums to access the job market, which places them in 
debt to their friends, families, and other creditors. It also exists be-
cause statute: a) links work permits to job contracts, thereby expos-
ing migrants to the arbitrary whims of their employers; and b) places 
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employers in a position of paternal responsibility over their migrant 
employees, privileging the voices of the former while silencing those 
of the latter.
Men and women from countries like Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, 
China, and the Philippines often pay hefty sums to agents or training 
centres in order to obtain jobs in Singapore. I have met some Bangla-
deshi workers who paid more than S$10,000 (£4,900) for their jobs. 
Raising that money often requires loans from family or friends back 
home, as well as the lease or sale of family land. It is an immediate sunk 
cost that heaps pressure on the worker’s shoulders to do whatever it 
takes to succeed.
Upon arrival in Singapore these workers enter into a system very 
similar to the kafala or sponsorship system employed in some Mid-
dle Eastern nations. Their work permits, which allow them to stay in 
Singapore, are bound to specific employers. The employer is able to 
cancel this work permit at any time. When that happens, workers have 
little recourse to challenge the decision. Such a situation gives employ-
ers huge power over their employees; a situation exacerbated by many 
employers’ habit of confiscating passports.
For women working as FDWs, the situation is also complicated by the 
fact that they are required to live in their employers’ homes. 
“Some of the problems of FDWs having to live in the homes of their 
employers include the high risk of sexual and physical assaults, long 
working hours, confinement and the lack of privacy and space,” writes 
Shelley Thio, an NGO volunteer who has worked extensively with 
migrant workers. “I have a case where an employer would lock her 
FDW in the kitchen every time she goes out because the kitchen has a 
CCTV camera to monitor her movements. I have seen an employer go 
through an FDW’s personal belongings and bags because she claimed 
that the FDW stole her jewellery.”
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This lack of agency permeates into every part of a worker’s life in Sin-
gapore, but is particularly apparent when things go wrong. For exam-
ple, when a worker becomes ill or injured it is more often than not 
the employer who makes the decisions for them. I once accompanied 
the volunteer of a migrant rights’ NGO to see a Cambodian domestic 
worker in hospital. She had allegedly been ill-treated after she had left 
her employer and moved back into the recruitment agency’s dormi-
tory, where she had fallen sick. She wanted to be discharged from the 
hospital. But the hospital was unwilling to discharge her to anyone but 
her agent or her previous employer, who was still listed in her work 
permit as being responsible for her. She, understandably, was unwill-
ing to go back with either.
If she had been anyone other than a migrant worker she would have 
been able to discharge herself from hospital. She was 38 years old and 
of sound mind. But because of her status as a worker in Singapore, 
someone had to be responsible for her. In the end, her previous em-
ployer had to sign a letter authorising the hospital to discharge her to 
the NGO worker and be taken to a shelter for domestic workers.
The hierarchy of authority and lack of agency also become visible when 
a migrant is injured on the job. Khan Momen is a Bangladeshi worker 
who claimed to have fallen while working with a friend on a scissor 
lift. His employer countered by suggesting that he had been injured in 
a fight, and was therefore not eligible for work injury compensation. 
Khan Momen was subsequently charged with two counts of making 
false statements to an officer of the Ministry of Manpower. At his trial, 
his employer produced witnesses who said that he had been involved 
in a fight. Khan Momen was convicted and jailed for four weeks, then 
repatriated to Bangladesh without a cent for his injury.
It’s difficult to determine whether Khan Momen was telling the truth. 
The court certainly didn’t think so, especially with witnesses testifying 
otherwise. But NGO volunteers who have experience with such cases 
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point to several underlying issues that greatly disadvantage any mi-
grant worker caught in such a situation.
Transient Workers Count Too (TWC2), a migrant rights organisation, 
reported in 2013 that about a third of workers surveyed reported being 
accompanied to the hospital by their boss or a supervisor, who then 
did all the talking for them. Another third said that both they and their 
boss/supervisor spoke with the doctor, with “varying degrees of input”.
The results of the survey have prompted TWC2 to question the reli-
ability of early hospital case notes. If employers speak on behalf of their 
workers, it is easy for them to insert their own version of events even 
when they do not witness the accident personally. When Ministry of 
Manpower investigators look into case notes to determine the veracity 
of a worker’s injury claim, whose words will they see?
“When the employer has the right to terminate the employee at any 
time (online cancellation of the work permit without the worker even 
knowing about it) and the worker fears repatriation as he has a huge 
debt back home—it is a situation where there is a huge power imbal-
ance,” wrote TWC2 volunteer Christine Pelly. In such a context, work-
ers might also be afraid to testify against their employers in court.
It’s never easy to tell when things come down to a “he said, she said” 
situation. But when workers lack agency on such a large scale they do 
not and cannot compete on a level playing field. 
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Freedom fighters: freelancing as direct action
Migrant domestic workers in the Middle East act as if they were already 
free when they resist the constraining kafala system by setting out on 
their own as freelancers.
Mark Johnson
Direct action, a defining feature of political practice in progressive so-
cial movements, is ‘the defiant insistence on acting as if one is already 
free’. I contend that migrant domestic workers in the Middle East prac-
tice direct action when they live and work as freelancers outside the 
regular system of sponsorship known commonly as the kafala system. 
The kafala system of visa sponsorship confers largely unregulated 
powers on employers to control their migrant employees, and restricts 
the latter’s ability to transfer to another employer without the consent 
of the initial sponsor. The kafala system applies to many sectors of em-
ployment, but in this article I focus on migrant domestic workers. If 
employment ends, then the migrant domestic worker’s documented 
residency status also ends. The transfer of state powers to employers is 
further strengthened by the notion that governments ought not to in-
terfere in the private sphere of the home and family. This is now widely 
interpreted to include the employment relationships that exist within 
this sphere. Migrant domestic labour is not regulated by employment 
law, and those laws that nominally protect domestic workers are main-
ly unenforced. 
We now have a reasonable understanding of the kafala system and its 
consequences for domestic workers. We know much less about the 
many women working outside of that system as freelancers. Freelanc-
ing refers to a situation in which migrant domestic workers leave their 
regular place of formal employment—violating the terms of their kaf-
ala-based visa permit—and subsequently negotiate a contract of em-
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ployment with another. Working as a freelancer often brings enhanced 
pay and better conditions of employment, such as agreed working 
hours and time off: freelancers also frequently live outside of their em-
ployer’s home, a luxury rarely afforded to migrant workers in regular 
domestic employment. The trade-off is that because freelancing usual-
ly entails transfer to another employer without the previous employer’s 
consent, freelancers are subject to arrest and deportation. 
Freelancing may be understood as both a product of and enabled by 
the sponsorship system that creates conditions for labour coercion 
and abuse. Migrant domestic workers who abscond from employers 
do so not just because they have been subjected to specific forms of 
abuse—withholding of wages, excessive workloads, and confiscation 
of travel documents—but also because the situation of employment 
fundamentally constricts and constrains their choice and freedom of 
movement. While many would deem migrant domestic workers who 
escape such abuse as victims of ‘modern-day slavery’ or trafficking, 
their direct action serves to reject such labels and to re-claim their 
agency by seizing the initiative and acting precisely as if they were free. 
In sociology we call this type of behaviour prefigurative politics, 
meaning that individuals are choosing to act as if they live in the world 
they desire rather than in the world they inhabit. Describing freelanc-
ing as direct action and as an act of political prefiguration may seem a 
bit of a stretch. However, if direct action is not about people deciding 
in advance what qualifies as an act of freedom or about agreeing on 
the aims of freedom, but rather simply about people reconstructing 
social relations by acting as if they were free, then it seems reasonable 
to suggest that freelancers are a type of (non-violent) social movement.
I see freelancers as constituting a social movement despite the fact they 
rarely coalesce into a more coherent collectivity. A notable exception 
to this were the camps that sprung up in Saudi Arabia recently to pro-
test government attempts to regularise and/or deport irregular mi-
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grants, including freelancers. Such examples are uncommon though, 
and freelancers most often rely on transnational networks of kin and 
co-ethnics to enable their practices of freedom. Through these net-
works, they create and experience a sense of solidarity with other free-
lancers through discursive acts of identification, affirming, and assert-
ing alongside one another that they are people who practice freedom.
People’s capacity to act, despite and because of the system of constraints 
they face, is one reason that using the language of slavery to describe 
migrant domestic workers is problematic. The historical tendency of 
European abolitionists to overlook the agency and resistance of people 
who were enslaved in the past is replayed in contemporary representa-
tions of migrant domestic workers as the slaves of today.
Section three
Trafficking and slavery
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Bound and determined: new abolitionism and the 
campaign against modern slavery
The question of mobility was central to struggles against the transatlantic 
slave trade and slavery. Current campaigns focus on the journey into 
slavery, overlooking the spatial captivity entailed in ‘modern slavery’.
Edlie Wong
Over a century and a half after President Abraham Lincoln 
issued the Emancipation Proclamation, millions remain in 
bondage—children forced to take part in armed conflict or 
sold to brothels by their destitute families, men and women 
who toil for little or no pay, who are threatened and beaten 
if they try to escape.
Thus begins Barack Obama’s presidential proclamation inaugurating 
the 2014 National Slavery and Human Trafficking Prevention Month. 
It couches a humanitarian anti-trafficking appeal in the familiar terms 
of an anti-slavery struggle that—it is often said—continues to be 
waged. We see this suggestion in many contemporary campaigns to 
end human trafficking. Organisations such as New York’s New Aboli-
tionists, Free the Slaves, and Anti-Slavery International portray them-
selves as carrying forward the crusade begun by the abolitionists who 
spoke out against the transatlantic slave trade. However, their educa-
tional campaigns often take up the mantle of ‘new abolitionism’ with-
out addressing the mixed legacies of the abolitionism that they invoke. 
Furthermore, their efforts to raise public awareness often focus on the 
journey into trafficking and slavery, yet overlook the weight of the legal 
and social edifices built by modern states to curtail and prevent escape.
Mobility was central to political struggles against African chattel 
slavery and the indentured or bonded Asian ‘coolie’ labour used to 
supplement and replace it in the Atlantic economy. Slavery demanded 
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the regulation of movement. Disciplinary control over black bodies 
in space was essential to the theory of mastery. “At the heart of the 
process of enslavement was a spatial impulse: to locate bondpeople 
in plantation space and to control, indeed to determine, their move-
ments and activities,” writes the historian Stephanie Camp. Slave states 
restricted mobility in part through the use of passes and residency 
licenses that declared the bearer either property of someone else or 
freed (manumitted) resident of the state. Coastal slave states went even 
further by enacting Negro Seamen Acts. These prohibited the entry 
of free black sailors and quarantined them in local prisons for as long 
as their vessels remained in port (and under threat of enslavement if 
prison fees went unpaid).
Black spatial captivity was not limited to slave jurisdictions. Sojourner 
laws in northern states allowed slaveholders to travel through or re-
main on free soil for periods of time without forfeiting their human 
property. They worked in concert with the 1850 Fugitive Slave Law, 
which compelled northern citizens and agencies to aid in the recapture 
of runaway slaves. Moreover, transatlantic anti-slavery activists such as 
Frederick Douglass and William Wells Brown discovered that manu-
mission or legal freedom did not confer federal recognition when the 
State Department denied their passport requests on the basis of race. 
State and federal governments acted on their powers to determine 
who circulated within and crossed their borders; they systematically 
restricted black mobility.
Historical abolitionists began explicitly identifying personal liberty 
with the freedom of movement in their print and legal campaigns. 
They traced this concept back to William Blackstone’s Commentaries 
on English Law: “personal liberty consists in the power of locomotion, 
of changing situation, or removing one’s person to whatsoever places 
one’s own inclination may direct, without imprisonment or restraint”. 
This right of locomotion was essential to freedom, just as its denial was 
essential to enslavement. It constituted a theft of birthright that was 
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synonymous with the theft of person in slavery. 
The end of legal slavery held out the promise of a world in which mo-
bility was no longer restricted, policed, or criminalised. For the newly 
liberated, wrote the scholar Saidiya Hartman, “the sheer capacity to 
move…provided the only palpable evidence of freedom”. Abolition, 
however, did not ease the destructive impact of white racism or pro-
tect the liberated from new forms of captivity, such as forced labour 
contracting, debt peonage, sharecropping, and convict leasing pro-
grammes. At the dawn of the twentieth century, the emerging legal 
architecture of Jim Crow curtailed the freedom of movement in ways 
tragically continuous with the past era of slavery.
The types of exploitation often referred to as ‘modern slavery’ are ex-
acerbated by immigration controls and the forms of spatial captivity 
they entail. Trafficking today remains largely understood in terms of 
involuntary transit or transfer, even though overt coercion may not 
have influenced departure, and the migration itself may have involved 
different degrees of legality. The earliest efforts to parse these differenc-
es took place in the context of historical abolitionism.
Just months before the Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln signed 
the “Act to prohibit the ‘Coolie Trade’ by American citizens in Ameri-
can Vessels”, in response to public outcries against American participa-
tion in what was called ‘the yellow trade’. The formal end of the transat-
lantic slave trade and domestic slavery precipitated wide-scale labour 
crises across the western hemisphere. The plantation economies of the 
US South and the British and Spanish Caribbean drove demand for 
disposable, cheap replacements from colonial India and China. The 
Coolie Trade Prohibition Act was America’s last slave-trade regulation 
and its first federal immigration restriction. It explicitly differentiated 
illegal human importation from immigration, and established certifi-
cation of voluntary emigration as the condition of lawful entry into the 
US. This fundamental distinction between voluntary and involuntary 
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migration has also structured more recent trafficking protocols, in-
cluding the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children.
Efforts to combat trafficking have “consistently translated into efforts 
to restrict movement”. As a consequence, trafficking prevention often 
encourages anti-immigrant policies that fortify national borders and 
further restrict legitimate movement in ways that are detrimental to 
migrants. The confiscation of passports and other documents make 
it difficult for trafficked persons to establish their legal identity or cir-
cumvent immigration controls. Even documented migrants caught 
up in the global networks of exploitative labour relations often find 
themselves ineligible for various forms of institutional relief. Relating 
the broader history of abolitionism to contemporary struggles against 
modern slavery helps us better recognise how transatlantic slavery and 
its prevention were both predicated upon a vast legal architecture of 
policing movement that bound the formerly enslaved to new forms 
of servitude after emancipation. To address contemporary forms of 
trafficking or ‘modern slavery’ without acknowledging the freedom of 
movement as a fundamental human right (one recognised by the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights) inadvertently contributes to the 
problem and neglects the complex history of struggle to which ‘new 
abolitionist’ organisations lay claim.
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Rights talk, wrong comparison: trafficking and 
transatlantic slavery
Transatlantic slavery relied on force to move people, while today’s 
‘trafficking’ does not. Vulnerable migrants have more in common with 
those escaping from historical slavery than those entering into it.
Julia O’Connell Davidson
‘Human trafficking’, according to Free the Slaves, is the process through 
which a person ‘is moved from one place to another for the purpose 
of enslavement’, a definition eagerly seized upon by Western political 
leaders since it allows them to present their efforts to control borders 
as part of a moral struggle for human rights and against slavery. But 
what are the similarities between what is described as ‘trafficking’ and 
the transatlantic slave trade to which it is routinely compared? There 
are no modern equivalents of the many fortresses and castles that dot-
ted the western coast of African slave trading regions, in which cap-
tured people were held in dungeons, sometimes for long periods, be-
fore being loaded and shackled on slave ships. Today, whether queuing 
outside recruitment offices or waiting for a boat owner to take them 
across the Mediterranean, those who may or may not end up in high-
ly exploitative and heavily restricted conditions are invariably people 
who actively want to migrate, and generally have excellent reasons for 
wishing to do so. 
The transatlantic slave trade relied upon overwhelming physical force 
at every stage of movement. What is dubbed ‘trafficking’ does not. In 
fact, attention to people’s motivations for moving provokes a very dif-
ferent kind of comparison between past and present. It suggests that 
contemporary migrants who are vulnerable to exploitation and abuse 
have more in common with those who sought to escape from New 
World slavery, than those transported into it. 
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Keeping chattel slaves in
Though legally constructed as property, those held in chattel slavery 
remained human beings with wills of their own. This presented slave-
holders with a unique set of problems that they did not face with their 
inanimate property. To enjoy their property rights, slaveholders need-
ed to closely control the mobility of the enslaved. At the same time, 
it was not in their interest to literally imprison slaves, as a slave held 
permanently captive in a dungeon would not be a productive asset. 
Physically constraining them by means of balls, chains and other such 
instruments also was often impractical, as slaves were often needed to 
run errands or transport produce, among other tasks.
Slaveholders wanted to simultaneously allow and repress the mobility 
of their human property, and they relied heavily on the law and law 
enforcers to secure these contradictory goals. In Barbados, the Slave 
Code was revised in 1688 to introduce a pass system, making it man-
datory for slaves to carry a pass or ticket when leaving their plantation. 
It also placed the burden of policing this system on all white men, 
requiring them to whip and detain wandering slaves until claimed by 
their owners. This system for controlling the enslaved was mimicked 
and elaborated in slave states of the American South. From 1642 in 
Virginia, ship captains were prohibited from setting sail with passen-
gers who had no pass. Here and elsewhere, extremely punitive sanc-
tions were incrementally introduced against captains and owners of 
vessels found carrying fugitive slaves to freedom, and against anyone 
offering succour and assistance to slaves as they made long, difficult, 
and extremely dangerous journeys by foot. 
For escaping slaves, the journey to freedom was often across harsh 
physical terrain, usually without benefit of map or geographical 
knowledge. Those fleeing from Texas to Mexico (where slavery had 
been abolished in 1829), for instance, faced the peril of armed slave 
hunting parties, getting lost in the desert, and even being captured by 
nomadic Comanches or Apaches. Sometimes, in exchange for a small 
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sum, Mexicans living in Texas would guide them to the border. Here 
and elsewhere, escaping slaves also took great risks by placing their 
trust in a third party. Punishments for captured runaways included 
whipping, stocking, ear cropping and other mutilations. Though some 
of those who smuggled slaves to freedom were brave altruists in the 
mould of Harriet Tubman, others who offered assistance proceeded to 
cheat or betray them. 
Keeping unauthorised migrants out
There are striking similarities between the techniques designed by slave 
states to contain slave mobility, and those deployed by contemporary 
states to manage and control migration. For passes and tickets, read 
passports and visas; for laws criminalising ship captains who assist-
ed fugitive slaves, read carrier sanctions. As Slave Codes historically 
obliged all white citizens to police the movement of slaves, so increas-
ingly in Britain, the entire community is being mustered to monitor 
unauthorised movement. Employers, universities, and now hospitals 
and private landlords are all legally obliged to check the status of mi-
grants and report those suspected of living in the country without 
authorisation or of breaking the terms within which they have been 
permitted to move. Banks and building societies too face sanctions if 
they allow ‘illegal’ migrants to open accounts.
In 2002, the Immigration Act in Malaysia was amended to introduce 
whipping for illegal migrants and for those who employ them. Three 
years later, a Volunteer Corps was granted powers to arrest irregular 
migrants. Corporal punishments are not administered to irregular 
migrants in the EU, Australia or the United States, but their border 
policies are lethal. Many deaths are attributable to the deliberate ac-
tions of state actors. There are also noticeable continuities as regards 
contemporary states’ methods of limiting the mobility of migrant 
workers whose entry they do authorise, and the ways in which slave 
and colonial states simultaneously enabled but constricted the mobil-
ity of slaves. 
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Immigration controls generate markets for migration services (both 
state authorised and clandestine), and it is true that actors in these 
markets do sometimes exploit, cheat, and/or mire migrants in debt. 
They may even rape, hold hostage, or kill those they have promised to 
assist. However, many simply provide a service, albeit often at a high 
price. Many irregular migrants even receive support and assistance 
for purely altruistic reasons, or on the basis of kinship or friendship, 
and not for profit. As was the case for escaping slaves, the motives and 
practices of those who facilitate unauthorised cross border movement 
today span the full moral spectrum from thuggery to selflessness. But 
no matter where they stand on this spectrum, they are criminals in 
the eyes of state actors, just as all those who facilitated the movement 
of fugitive slaves were criminalised by nineteenth-century slave states. 
What have rights got to do with it?
The legal edifice that controls mobility today was no more designed to 
protect human rights, and is no more compatible with that ambition, 
than what was constructed by slave states centuries ago. Its object is 
to deny the ‘right of locomotion’ to certain groups of human beings. 
Without that right, people are at heightened risk of abuse and exploita-
tion in the course of movement and at the point of destination. De-
scribing those for whom the risk turns into reality as ‘trafficked’ and 
comparing their situation to that of Africans transported into slavery 
displays a startling indifference to the historical realities of transat-
lantic slavery. It also exonerates states rather than holding them ac-
countable for the staggering human cost of the immigration regimes 
(including anti-trafficking policies) over which they preside.
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Silencing the challenging voices of the global 
‘subalterns’ in anti-trafficking discourse
Contemporary anti-trafficking discourses are powered by a series of 
gendered and racialised binaries that silence the voices of the global 
subalterns, undermining their agency and defusing their transgressions.
Lucrecia Rubio Grundell
Contemporary forms of human trafficking are analysed from a vari-
ety of different and sometimes competing perspectives. Rarely is there 
consensus among academics, politicians, or activists regarding what 
‘trafficking’ is or what to do about it. Despite these differences, con-
temporary anti-trafficking discourses agree on one idea: there is such a 
thing as ‘trafficking’ that can be discovered, analysed, and told.
‘Trafficking’ however, is not a neutral concept into which facts can be 
easily inserted, and from which policy responses can be efficiently de-
rived. Instead, the ‘reality’ of trafficking is created by those discourses 
that have become dominant and accepted as ‘truth’. These discourses 
allow for particular understandings and actions, while foreclosing oth-
ers. It is through these discourses therefore, that ‘trafficking’ emerges 
as a phenomenon that can be governed. 
The convergence we’ve seen among otherwise disparate—and at times 
contradictory—narratives results from their common use of concep-
tual binaries to render the complexities of trafficking understandable: 
legal versus illegal migration, slavery versus free labour, or victim ver-
sus criminal. These binaries, which often become gendered and racial-
ised, serve to articulate identities, notions of belonging, and concep-
tions of development in ways that silence the challenging voices of the 
global ‘subalterns’. The subalterns, according to Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak, are not simply those who are oppressed or disenfranchised. 
They are those who are oppressed and disenfranchised in such a way 
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that forecloses any possibility of moving upwards. The global subal-
terns therefore, are those populations who are removed from all lines 
of social mobility. They are relegated to a space that is not a space, a 
position of political invisibility and misrecognition that does not per-
mit the formation of a recognisable basis of action.
The many binaries of anti-trafficking discourse
All hegemonic narratives understand trafficking to be an epiphenom-
enon of irregular migration, in opposition to legally approved modes 
of migration. This is problematic for two main reasons. First, as the 
work of Rutvica Andrijasevic and others has shown, trafficking can 
have elements of legal migration, such as legally obtained visas, and 
legal migration may include illegal elements too, such as bribes from 
state authorities. 
Second and more importantly, to assume that regular and irregular 
migration are completely different hides the fact that such a distinc-
tion depends on the sovereign power of nation-states to control their 
borders. The power of this discursive separation ultimately serves to 
protect nation-states from those who are considered unwanted, and 
to justify a state’s use of force to accomplish that goal. It also conceals 
that a causal relationship exists between the two, as many migrants 
are forced into irregular forms of migration precisely because formal 
migration channels are not available to them. 
Another dichotomy employed by hegemonic anti-trafficking discours-
es distinguishes between slavery and free wage labour. The absolute 
nature of the slave’s subjection is contrasted with capitalist wage labour 
underpinned by the presence of a contractual relation. This relation, 
however, presupposes the free nature of the contracting subject. Be-
cause slavery does not exist as a legal status however, the distinction 
between slavery and free labour actually depends on the definition of 
what constitutes tolerable and intolerable forms of exploitation.
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This definition is, above all, political. Current anti-trafficking discours-
es render invisible the ‘unspectacular’ exploitation suffered by many as 
a result of the routine operations of global capitalism. They do this by 
limiting the ‘intolerable’ to the extreme exploitation connoted by the 
notion of ‘slavery’. Moreover, anti-trafficking discourses depoliticise 
the question of migrants’ labour rights by racially representing slavery 
as characteristic of non-democratic societies, and wage labour as spe-
cific to capitalist market relations in liberal democracies. This discon-
nects their economic exploitation from global economic disparities.
Forced vs. voluntary: constructed innocence and guilt
Given that many low wage workers undergo similar experiences of 
exploitation, anti-trafficking discourses must further distinguish be-
tween forced and voluntary migrants. This singles out the ‘experience’ 
of trafficked persons, depicting them as ‘innocent’ within activities 
that are criminalised, such as irregular migration or prostitution. The 
collateral effect of this is to divide migrants into different categories 
according to their degree of agency.
These categories are, again, heavily racialised and gendered. In fact, 
while most legal instruments designed to combat trafficking include 
a specific mention of women and children, no such reference is con-
tained in legal instruments regarding smuggling. Anti-trafficking dis-
courses often depict women (especially non-western women) as par-
ticularly devoid of agency, victimised, and subject to (sexual) abuse. By 
linking the risks of migration and sexual abuse to the fact that they are 
women however, anti-trafficking discourses often encourage women to 
not migrate at all in the name of their own protection.
The forced/voluntary distinction is applied far beyond migration. 
Prostitution, for example, tends to be analysed within the dominant 
western script on sexuality. This confines sex to intimacy and love, and 
thereby portrays all sexual acts that take place outside of such spheres 
as degraded or degrading. As a result, prostitution is often understood 
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as immoral and inherently sexist, and therefore contrary to the rights 
of women. This understanding makes those who consent to engage in 
prostitution somehow ‘guilty’ or ‘wrong’, whether immoral themselves 
or suffering from a severe case of false gender consciousness. 
The distinction between forced and voluntary prostitution therefore, 
is underpinned by a distinction that separates ‘whores’ from the he-
gemonic understanding of ‘womenhood’. This distinction not only di-
vides and disciplines women, but determines their innocence or guilt. 
It also upholds a view of sex as naturally procreative, thus reifying the 
notion of the ‘good sexual citizen’ who restricts sex to the realm of the 
intimate and private.
Victims vs. criminals: the final dichotomy
Ultimately, all these distinctions amount to a clear separation between 
‘victims’ and ‘criminals’. Paradoxically, the need to draw such distinc-
tion derives from current anti-trafficking discourses themselves. These 
discourses must adequately distinguish ‘real’ trafficked persons from 
‘bogus’ ones if they are to consider individual cases of prostitution, 
irregular migration, and transnational organised crime as ‘victims of 
trafficking’. This distinction is, like all the binaries upon which it is 
sustained, gendered and racialised as the role of ‘victim’ or ‘criminal’ is 
linked to particular identities. 
In the words of Jo Doezema, “it is not an accident of history, but a 
legacy of empire, that third world prostitutes’ suffering bodies are at 
the forefront of certain feminist anti-trafficking campaigns today”. 
Non-western women are the typical victims of trafficking within he-
gemonic anti-trafficking discourses. A nexus is established between 
their identity and their victimhood status. They are presented as poor, 
uneducated, tradition-bound, and victimised, and consequently in 
need of ‘rescue’. ‘Criminals’ too are gendered and racialised, as they are 
identified primarily as male and non-western criminal gangs.
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In using gendered and racialised notions of ‘victims’ and ‘criminals’, 
current anti-trafficking discourses locate responsibility in the un-
scrupulous practices of certain individuals, or in terrible cultural and 
economic conditions originating most commonly outside of the West. 
They also position western governments as unrelated to the situation 
of vulnerability of irregular labour migrants. As such, they then be-
come rescuers with pure intentions and a moral commitment to the 
care of others. Such discourses ultimately serve to silence the voices 
of the global ‘subalterns’. They construct a hierarchy of patriarchal and 
economic development that depoliticises their agency and defuses any 
challenge that their transgressions may pose to the structuring of citi-
zenship, mobility, and labour rights in exclusionary terms.
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Safe migration as an emerging anti-trafficking 
agenda?
Safe migration has become a popular way for anti-trafficking organisations 
to re-articulate how a concern with labour exploitation relates to migration, 
yet it remains unclear how ‘safety’ can be ensured.
Sverre Molland
Current efforts to combat ‘modern slavery’ must be understood within 
the wider context of discourses, programmes, and policies that target 
migrant labour. Since the 1990s, the dominant political focus has been 
on ‘human trafficking’. Although anti-trafficking remains popular, it 
has been subject to considerable criticism, even within the anti-traf-
ficking sector itself. A key point of contestation regards the ways in 
which anti-trafficking relates to migration policies. 
For example, it is well known that anti-trafficking discourses easily 
lend themselves to anti-immigration agendas. Deporting a migrant 
under the auspices of anti-trafficking efforts makes deportation sound 
almost heartwarming: the poor victim gets to be re-united with their 
loved ones ‘at home’. The language of ‘modern slavery’ unsurprisingly 
emerged out of these anti-trafficking discourses. However in recent 
times we have also seen other related approaches come to prominence. 
One example is ‘safe migration’, a concept that allows aid programmes, 
activists, and moral entrepreneurs to advocate for migrants in ways 
that attempt to evade a focus on repressive border control regimes.
The concept of ‘safe migration’ is not entirely new, but it has been gain-
ing prevalence ever since organisations began to notice donor fatigue 
regarding human trafficking. As one senior IOM official in the Me-
kong region recently told me, “the human trafficking candle is burning 
down”. In response, programmes referring to ‘safe migration’ are now 
becoming more common. 
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So, what it ‘safe migration’?
‘Safe migration’ is related to, but not synonymous with, ‘legal’ migra-
tion. Activists and scholars alike argue that providing legal avenues 
for labour migrants reduces the risk of exploitative practices in labour 
supply chains. The 2009 Human Development Report explicitly argues 
that legalising labour migration contributes positively to both the 
well-being of migrants (including reduced risk of trafficking) and to 
development. ‘Safe migration’ programmes however go beyond this to 
usually include four elements: the legal status of migrants, progres-
sive awareness raising, trust building (brokers vs. social networks vs. 
licensed recruitment firms), and institutional support mechanisms in 
the migration process (such as hotline phone numbers for migrants).
Thus, aid organisations move beyond a strict focus on the law when 
they talk of ‘safe migration’. They do not merely advocate legalising 
migration; they also work towards making migration safer by em-
phasising the importance of social networks and progressive aware-
ness-raising amongst migrant populations. As with efforts to legalise 
labour migration, a key assumption is that empowering migrants will 
curtail the market for traffickers and other unscrupulous facilitators of 
mobility. Within this framework, both officially sanctioned modes of 
recruitment (licensed recruitment companies/brokers) and informal 
migration networks of friends and acquaintances are assumed to re-
sult in better (‘safer’) conditions for labour migrants. Hence, implicit 
inferences are made regarding vulnerability, risk and safety in relation 
to different modes of recruitment, and are evident in programmes in 
the Mekong region and elsewhere. 
It is therefore important to remain cautious regarding what ‘safe mi-
gration’ can do to improve conditions for migrant labourers. As I have 
shown elsewhere, assuming certain ‘types’ of migrant recruitment 
constitute ‘safety’ (such as official labour recruitment companies, or 
informal migration networks) is problematic as it is precisely through 
such arrangements that non-consensual recruitment takes place. 
facebook.com/BTSoD • 83
Migration and Mobility
Furthermore, safe migration in the form of legal migration status can 
work in counter-intuitive ways. Rather than producing safety through 
legal status, working permits and passports can become capital re-
sources that are appropriated and produced through brokering net-
works. For example, evidence of residential address—required infor-
mation as part of passport application—can become a commodity that 
can be traded through brokers. In my own research I have also come 
across cases where labour permits are arranged through brokers and 
the fee is added to the migrant’s debt bondage. There are also instances 
in which labour migrants pawn their passports to brokers in exchange 
for short-term cash.
Questions must also be raised regarding what safe migration pro-
grammes actually do. For example, migrant hotlines are frequently 
mentioned amongst programmes that profess ‘safe migration’ ap-
proaches. Such hotlines have already existed under the auspices of 
‘anti-trafficking’ for years, and it’s more than unclear how ‘hot’ such 
hotlines are. My current research on safe migration and hotlines in the 
Mekong region suggests not only that very few migrants actually use 
them, but that operators have significant limitations in acting upon the 
few phone calls they receive. 
Safe migration awareness-raising can also easily place the onus of 
change on the migrant themselves, thereby asking very little in terms 
of transforming how labour markets and migration regimes oper-
ate. Whereas labour migrants receive training in how to reduce risk 
through migration, less is done to address why labour markets are 
structured in ways that produce such risk in the first place. Finally, 
safe migration efforts may also be a two-edged sword, given that they 
introduce increasing forms of surveillance of migrant populations. 
Despite the official aim of migrant ‘safety’, there are no guarantees 
against safe migration programmes turning into instruments for social 
control and punitive anti-immigration agendas.
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So, what are the positives? A notable contrast with both ‘modern slav-
ery’ and ‘human trafficking’ is how safe migration avoids any fetishi-
sation of misery. In other words, safe migration places a specific focus 
on the desired outcome of labour migration (i.e. safety) as opposed to 
a humanitarian discourse of suffering. As such it may at least provide a 
useful frame for discussions regarding migrant labour policies.
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‘Foreign criminals’ and victims of trafficking: 
fantasies, categories, and control
Casting migrants and smugglers as ‘victims and villains’ allows states 
to play saviour and legitimates immigration enforcement as the sole 
appropriate response.
Luke de Noronha 
Some people who live outside of their country of origin don’t really 
count as migrants. They might be expats; they might not be named 
at all. But Australian backpackers, French nannies, and international 
bankers are not really what we mean when we talk about migrants. 
If, however, you are the kind of person we mean when we talk about 
migrants—i.e. you are racialised and/or poor—then you are generally 
portrayed as either a victim or a villain. Migrants are constructed as 
victims and villains by a range of actors, including the state, journal-
ists, politicians, judges, migrant advocates, and academics. 
Gender and race are central to determining who goes where within 
this framework. In my work on ‘foreign criminals’, I examine the me-
chanics of gender and race in producing villains. ‘Foreign criminals’ 
have attracted much media and political interest in recent years. They 
are discursively constructed as racialised men who commit acts of 
hypermasculinist violence, often sexual, thus imperilling ‘our’ streets 
and, importantly, ‘our’ women. This construction of the ‘foreign crimi-
nal’ as a monstrous villain works to justify, on moral grounds, policies 
of imprisonment, indefinite detention, and deportation. This narrative 
is a gross oversimplification that relies on imaginaries familiar to those 
who work on issues surrounding ‘trafficking.
The Victim of Trafficking (VoT for short) is not a human type. It’s an 
administrative category produced by immigration controls. This is not 
to deny that some migrant sex workers—women, men and trans peo-
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ple—find themselves in truly awful situations. Rather, it is to suggest 
that such administrative constructs do not necessarily reflect mean-
ingful distinctions from the perspective of the individuals concerned. 
The anti-trafficking narrative rests on a conception of the world in 
which nasty individuals force vulnerable people into servitude. Border 
controls have nothing to do with it whatsoever. The narrative further 
relies on crude images of suffering victims, images that marginal-
ise those who don’t fit the mould. Not every migrant sex worker fits 
the image of the ideal victim (see e.g. Mai on non-heteronormative 
migrant sex workers), but most—dare I say all?—would still benefit 
greatly from substantive human and labour rights. 
The images of the VoT and the ‘foreign criminal’, both entangled in 
a twisted fairy tale of caricatured weakness and barbarism, simplify 
and distort much messier realities. Casting non-citizens in these roles 
helps to rationalise immigration controls. 
When VoTs are constructed as helpless victims, held captive by un-
scrupulous (foreign) traffickers, enforcement becomes the appropriate 
response. As such, states are able to attest to the morality of immi-
gration controls; victims are saved as the authorities work valiantly to 
eradicate ‘sexual slavery’. The role of immigration controls in ‘hold-
ing people captive’ is effaced in this narrative. The vulnerabilities of 
migrant sex workers are reduced to individual and extreme forms of 
abuse; the state disappears only to reappear as saviour. Put simply, 
if traffickers are evil and VoTs helpless, then the state needs to act 
through aggressive forms of crime and immigration control.
Likewise, if non-citizen offenders are portrayed as violent, savage out-
siders then their expulsion becomes the only suitable response. This 
has wider implications for the legitimation of detention and deporta-
tion policies. Images of ‘foreign criminals’ as killers, rapists, and pae-
dophiles work to justify and celebrate the detention and deportation 
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of any non-citizen with a criminal conviction, and, increasingly, any 
non-citizen who is even associated with or accused of criminal con-
duct. Again, the narrative invokes victims and villains, with immigra-
tion controls working to protect the former and punish the latter. 
Importantly, the VoT and the ‘foreign criminal’ only become intelligi-
ble in relation to problematic ideas about race and gender. According 
to Rutvica Andrijasevic, the anti-trafficking narrative relies on images 
of “wounded and inanimate female bodies”. In other words, the women 
that need saving are usually racialised in problematic ways. Similarly, 
the figure of the ‘foreign criminal’ preys upon deeply entrenched fears 
about the dangerous sexuality of racialised men. Both of these sets of 
racialised and gendered stereotypes justify draconian forms of immi-
gration control and construct the state as a (masculine) saviour. 
I have become wary of this economy of suffering that undergirds most 
debates on migration. As Julia O’Connell Davidson notes:
Because suffering is not raw datum, it can be selectively 
recognised…unfortunately, it is perfectly possible for states 
simultaneously to recognise some kinds of suffering as a 
qualification for community inclusion, but continue to op-
erate the lethal immigration regimes and border controls 
that both deny and generate other kinds of suffering.
Arguing that rights should not be fastened onto suffering is not to deny 
that certain migrants have specific vulnerabilities. It is not to suggest 
that all migrant sex workers have it easy. Nor is it to ignore or underplay 
the pervasiveness of male sexual violence (sometimes non-citizens are 
guilty of hypermasculinist acts of sexual violence). However, we must 
remain fiercely critical of any conception of the state as protector. 
Migrant sex workers often don’t look like VoTs, and policies instituted 
under the anti-trafficking rubric tend to bolster the forms of control 
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directed at non-citizens who sell sex. Likewise, non-citizen ex-offend-
ers usually don’t look like the caricatured ‘foreign criminal’. Instead, 
their complex biographies might include experiences of racism, pov-
erty, irregularity, and exclusion. Finding room to speak about these 
migrants requires us to resist buying into black and white notions of 
victims and villains, or into any such fantasy that casts the state as a 
saviour of VoTs. We must, instead, attempt the much harder task of 
critically thinking about how race and gender play into our preconcep-
tions of who needs saving from whom.
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North Korean migrants in China: neither trafficked 
nor smuggled
North Koreans’ migration to China is highly complex, more so than when 
it is depicted simply as ‘human-trafficking’ and/or ‘modern slavery’ in 
anti-trafficking discourse.
Kyunghee Kook
The Korean Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) has formed a de-facto border 
barrier between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) 
and South Korea since the end of the Second World War. The DPRK, 
a Stalinist and totalitarian country governed by the dictatorship of the 
Kim family, also closely polices its borders with Russia and China, and 
authorises its people to travel abroad only in very exceptional cases. 
Despite these obstacles, political problems, economic crises, and food 
shortages have all combined to provoke an exodus of desperate North 
Koreans into China in search of sustenance, employment, and a better 
life. A North Korean woman described the absolute hunger that drove 
her and her family to cross the border into China to me: 
My family woke every morning worrying about what to 
eat. We usually got only a watery corn soup in a day. We 
sometimes had starved for three or four days. When there 
was nothing to eat, my sisters and I put some soil into the 
water and imagined that as a chicken soup and then drank 
it. I feared I would die of starvation. 
It is estimated that there are as many as 100,000 North Koreans in 
China, of whom more than half are women. The journey into China 
is extremely perilous, and escapees are not safe once they manage to 
cross the border. In China they are regarded as illegal aliens. If discov-
ered by the authorities, they will be repatriated to North Korea where 
they are punished by being sent to a labour camp, in effect, a concen-
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tration camp. Their illegal status in China also leaves them vulnerable 
to various forms of exploitations and violence.
North Korean men mainly find temporary, outdoor-based, manual 
labour such as construction and farming in China. However, working 
outside leaves them highly visible and thus vulnerable to arrest or de-
portation. For this reason, North Korean men tend to stay in China for 
only short periods, returning to North Korea once they have gained 
sufficient resources. North Korean women, by contrast, can find em-
ployment in more concealed places. They often work in private houses 
as domestic workers, in textile factories, or the sex industry, or they 
use marriage to Chinese men as a strategy for subsistence. The hidden 
nature of their opportunities in China places North Korean women in 
the contradictory situation of being simultaneously less susceptible to 
immigration crackdowns and more vulnerable to exploitation.
There is a good deal of evidence that the exploitation and abuse en-
dured by North Korean women in China can be extreme. This has led 
many human right groups, individual researchers, media reports, and 
international bodies such as UN to describe them as victims of ‘mod-
ern slavery’ and ‘human trafficking’. However, there is also evidence 
that their experience of exploitation and abuse ranges along a continu-
um, with some escapees experiencing poor but not violent conditions, 
and managing to earn and remit money home. Moreover, even when 
the abuse and exploitation is severe, escapees still regard the prospect 
of return to North Korea as more dreadful. One young woman who 
had been subject to forced prostitution and extensive violence said in 
an interview with National Human Rights Commission of Korea: “I 
could not report it to the Chinese police because I was illegal in China. 
I was so terrified to be repatriated North Korea, which would be the 
worst of all.” 
Barack Obama recently described North Korea as a “pariah state” 
whose heavily militarised border with the South marks “freedom’s 
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frontier”. We thus might imagine that those who flee it would be very 
readily accommodated within the framework of international law de-
signed to protect the human rights of people who move, or are moved, 
across borders. Who is this corpus of law intended to protect if not 
people who manage to escape over freedom’s frontier? And yet North 
Korean escapees often fall between the categories used in international 
law and by states to divide migrants into ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ 
groups—forced or voluntary, political refugee or economic migrant, 
trafficked or smuggled. 
Escapees from North Korea are fleeing hunger more often than out-
right political persecution. Starvation is the ‘collateral damage’ of the 
political system under which they live, and something that drives them 
to seek paid work in China in order to survive and/or remit money 
home. Once in China, they are vulnerable to conditions and experi-
ences often attributed to ‘victims of trafficking’, yet this vulnerability 
arises from their status as illegal migrants. It is not linked to coercion 
or deception in the course of movement.
On the contrary, their movement across the border is rarely forced. 
They want to move and so are generally ‘complicit’ with those who 
facilitate their movement. They look, in this respect, like the ‘econom-
ic migrants’ that states normally define as ‘smuggled’. In crossing the 
border, however, they commit what is considered a ‘crime’ by both the 
Chinese and the North Korean state, and this renders them liable to 
indefinite detention in horrific conditions if detected and returned 
home. Thus, ‘smuggled’ or ‘economic migrants’ are not quite the cor-
rect terms either for North Korean migrants in China. These concepts 
fail to capture the complexity and the fluidity of North Korean mi-
grants’ situations. 
To frame escapees’ situation as a problem of ‘trafficking’ does not help 
to protect them from this eventuality. On the one hand, adopting the 
language of trafficking limits the scope of concern to those who have 
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experienced a very narrow and particular constellation of abuse and 
exploitation. The rubric of trafficking excludes those who either man-
age to escape independently or to avoid unspeakably vicious treatment 
by employers or spouses in China, even if they would be subject to 
terrifying violence when returned to North Korea. On the other hand, 
even those afforded the status of ‘victim of trafficking’—not an easy 
status to attain, given that migrants must produce evidence demon-
strating that they were forced or deceived into moving, and coerced 
into forced labour—are not necessarily protected from return. North 
Koreans recognised as ‘victims of trafficking’ by the Chinese authori-
ties have been repatriated. Back in North Korea, they too face punish-
ment in labour camps. 
Many Western commentators would doubtless blame the Chinese 
government for its failure to recognise North Korean escapees as hav-
ing a right to asylum, and for returning ‘victims of trafficking’ to a 
state that will, predictably, fail to protect them as such. But how does 
China’s policy differ from that of governments of liberal democratic 
states, which also refuse to recognise flight from dire economic cir-
cumstances as a legitimate basis for claiming asylum, and which also 
send people identified as ‘victims of trafficking’ back to home states 
that lack the resources or the political will to protect them? For exam-
ple, the ‘trafficked victims’ who get settled in Western Europe or North 
America are often sent back to their countries of origin. Even if some 
of them receive the right of residence in those countries, the terms of 
their residency are commonly a limited certain period or for a short 
duration of criminal proceedings.  
The immigration and asylum policies of ‘non-pariah’ states may be de-
signed to keep people out rather than lock them in. But as the North 
Korean case illustrates, they have little to do with human rights. In-
deed, ‘trafficking’, ‘smuggling’, and ‘asylum’ as statist categories in an-
ti-trafficking discourses fail to understand or address the situation of 
North Koreans who manage to cross the border into China. 
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When spring comes, smugglers are in the news
Migrants in Morocco often attempt to cross the Mediterranean only after 
years of exploitation and exclusion. Their vulnerability is a product of EU 
policy and its preoccupation with ‘transit migration’.
Inka Stock
When spring comes the weather is fine in the Mediterranean and the 
sea is calm. Like every year, this is the time when media reports on 
large numbers of migrants drowning in the Mediterranean begin to 
multiply. In spring, we hear from government officials and journalists 
about the crisis engendered by a seemingly uncontrollable flood of 
migrants massing at the North African coast ready to cross to Europe. 
We hear how these migrants fall victim to ruthless smugglers who 
put their lives in danger, how they have gone through hell ‘transiting’ 
through many countries, again often smuggled across borders without 
valid papers. 
This vision drives calls to intensify actions against ‘trafficking rings’ in 
the Mediterranean, while at the same time to save money on rescue 
operations like mare nostrum, the Italian search and rescue operation 
that ran for much of 2014. If ‘smugglers’ and ‘traffickers’ (the terms are 
employed interchangeably in this context) are caught and punished, 
we are told, migrants will cease to suffer at their hands. This may ap-
pear to make some sort of intuitive sense, especially because it is re-
peated to us ad nauseam in the press and by politicians, but that story 
is incomplete. 
Libya was at the forefront of the news in 2015 as the starting point for 
the deadly journey to Italy. However, it is worth considering the situ-
ation of migrants at other parts the North African coast, particularly 
in those countries that have not been torn apart by civil conflict. These 
migrants’ experiences have primarily been shaped by recent changes 
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to both European and domestic migration policies. In Morocco, for 
example, migrants waiting to move to Europe are mostly from Sub-Sa-
haran African countries and have often spent five to ten years in the 
country. Some have unsuccessfully tried to cross several times, while 
others have never even attempted it because the price is high and the 
employment opportunities in Morocco are extremely limited. 
Many Sub-Saharan African migrants in Morocco have been there for 
a long time but have no formal immigration status. Morocco institut-
ed exceptional legalisation measures in September 2013, but a large 
undocumented population remains because many either do not meet 
the necessary criteria or arrived after the application deadline in De-
cember 2014. Those who were regularised furthermore only receive a 
one-year residence permit. This leaves them with few possibilities to 
find work, to train for a job, or to receive education. Though many of 
the migrants arrived through irregular channels, some entered Mo-
rocco legally on tourist or student visas. They gradually slipped into a 
situation of irregularity when their visas ran out and a change of status 
became difficult. 
Missing too from most media narratives is the fact that Sub-Saharan 
migrants in Morocco did not all travel there in order to get to Europe. 
They do not immediately seek out ‘smugglers’ to take them over the 
Mediterranean. Many actively try to make a life in Morocco or to study 
there, however current immigration laws make it virtually impossible 
to stay legally for an extended period of time. This was not always the 
case. Until the beginning of the millennium, penalties against those 
who stayed in the country without authorisation were only rarely ap-
plied. Indeed, the topic of irregular migrants rarely became an issue of 
domestic political importance.
This only changed when restricting and controlling migration—espe-
cially the phenomenon dubbed ‘transit migration’—became a pressing 
policy issue for the European Union. With its encouragement, Mo-
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rocco set in place new immigration legislation that included clearly 
defined sanctions against trafficking, smuggling, and irregular stay. It 
also began to enforce these rules with increasing vigour. It was only 
after mobility became criminalised that irregular migrants in Morocco 
began to live lives of ‘forced immobility’—the opposite of being ‘in 
transit’.
The long duration of their stay and their undocumented status com-
bine to facilitate situations of extreme exploitation in the labour 
market. Construction, domestic work, begging, and wage labour in 
the informal sector—often in slave-like conditions—are virtually the 
only earning opportunities available in the current economic system. 
Sub-Saharan migrants also face racial discrimination along with so-
cial, economic, political, and cultural marginalisation. This leaves 
many migrants to exist in a state of limbo, unable either to move fur-
ther or to return back home.
In European reporting, the Mediterranean crossing constitutes the last 
and most perilous leg of a linear journey. Sub-Saharan migrants were 
driven into this undertaking by false promises of riches and the de-
ceptive reassurances of wicked ‘smugglers’ or ‘traffickers’. This is very 
rarely, if ever, the truth. The decision to board a boat for an extremely 
dangerous trip is often taken after years suspended in an indetermi-
nate condition characterised by abuse, exploitation, and rightlessness. 
For some, their criminalisation as ‘illegal migrants’ so severely restricts 
their employment options that they simultaneously attempt to leave 
Morocco and make money by organising boat trips for others. This 
transforms them, in the eyes of the European Union, into the ‘smug-
glers’ and ‘traffickers’ we hear so much about. Their fellow migrants, 
however, rarely perceive them as ‘monsters’. On the contrary, they are 
often greatly esteemed because they offer the hope of escape from 
forced immobility. 
96 • opendemocracy.net/beyondslavery
Beyond Trafficking and Slavery
Every year in spring, when the sea is calm, irregular migrants in Mo-
rocco attempt to fulfil the dream of escaping the futureless limbo in 
which they are stuck. This limbo, and the exploitation and abuse with 
which it is associated, is the product of Morocco’s current migration 
policy. This policy was developed in direct collaboration with the Eu-
ropean Union as part of its ‘Global Approach to Migration’, a frame-
work that the EU has promoted with greater or lesser success in many 
African countries. Unfortunately, this part of the story is rarely in the 
news. Hand-wringing in Europe over forced migration and the death 
of migrants at sea aside, it is clear that the fate of those forced into 
immobility largely remains a matter of policy and moral indifference.
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Criminalising traffickers is an alibi for state-
produced vulnerability
The US State Department argues that imprisoning human traffickers 
protects vulnerable farmworkers, but misses the fact that migrant worker 
vulnerability stems from the precarious conditions the state itself creates.
Lyndsey P. Beutin
The National Underground Railroad Freedom Center in Cincinnati, 
Ohio unveiled a new exhibition in 2010 titled Invisible: Slavery Today, 
in the hopes that it would make the history of nineteenth-century 
abolitionism more relevant to today’s visitors. The exhibit, designed 
in collaboration with several prominent anti-trafficking advocacy or-
ganisations, depicts five types of trafficking victims. One of these is 
‘Mariano’, an undocumented farmworker who was smuggled into the 
United States from Guatemala on the promise of a job and a better 
life. A critical reading of ‘Mariano’s story’ reveals the ways in which 
punitive, carceral solutions are framed as ‘abolition’, as well as how US 
Government and US State Department narratives are reinforced by 
non-profit advocacy organisations and museums. 
Migrant farm labour has increasingly become part of the narrative 
of how and where trafficking happens in the United States. Mariano’s 
character is partially drawn from the work of the Coalition of Immoka-
lee Workers (CIW), a farmworker-led, grassroots organisation that has 
successfully brought lawsuits against growers on enslavement charges. 
CIW is one of the few farmworker organisations that has adopted the 
language of ‘modern day slavery’ to describe the most extreme cases 
of brutality against migrants. Official acknowledgement of such abuse 
constitutes an important note of self-critique amid the State Depart-
ment’s largely coercive pursuits to criminalise trafficking in other 
countries. Yet, the dynamics of labour trafficking remain represented 
in a good (the state) versus evil (individual traffickers) dramatic frame. 
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This emphasises the violence inflicted on individual migrants by indi-
vidual smugglers. It also downplays state violence and state respon-
sibility for the basic conditions inhabited by both sets of precarious 
individuals. This opens up rhetorical space to paradoxically rely on 
immigration, police, defence, and state department officials to ‘rescue’ 
undocumented workers from the dangers the state itself creates. 
Mariano’s story
Mariano is introduced to visitors as a migrant agriculture labourer 
who works long hours in poor conditions. According to the exhibition 
panel, Mariano is in this situation because of the lack of jobs in his 
home country:
Migrant labourers, like Mariano, are especially vulnerable 
to becoming enslaved. Desperate for work, they pay to 
be smuggled into countries where jobs are available. Em-
ployers can exploit these labourers by stealing their pay, 
coercing long hours of work, and keeping them in squalid 
conditions.
This introduction to the plight of migrant farmworkers has the po-
tential to very accurately unravel the structural conditions that make 
these sentences true. Agriculturalists in Mexico and Central America 
have been particularly desperate for jobs since the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) gutted national seed and fertilizer 
subsidies to small, cooperative, and subsistence farmers in Mexico. 
That same treaty did not ban domestic subsidies to American growers, 
which allows them to continue to sell their product on the “free” mar-
ket below the cost of production. Unable to compete, Mexican farmers 
cross the border in search of jobs. The United States facilitates this 
border crossing with the H-2A visa programme for temporary agri-
cultural labourers. Workers under this programme are granted limited 
protections and must remain with their sponsoring farm, while spon-
sors must provide housing for the workers.
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There are, of course, many more men and women in need of work than 
there are H-2A visas or sponsoring farms. In addition, the limitations 
built into the H-2A visa make the programme extremely undesirable 
for many migrants. These factors, combined with the fact that there are 
few—if any—legal ways for lower class Mexicans and Central Amer-
icans to obtain permanent residence and citizenship in the United 
States, compel the majority of such individuals to cross without tem-
porary status or other types of documentation.
The narrative told in the National Underground Railroad Freedom 
Center’s exhibition, however, does not go into the history and effects 
of American economic policy, free trade programmes, and tiered im-
migration laws. Instead of examining these enduring structures, which 
were engineered by the United States and which maintain migrants’ 
vulnerabilities, it individualises Mariano’s story and re-casts the state 
as the hero-protector. The panel reads:
Mariano told his story to investigators. Cesar [his traffick-
er] was arrested, convicted, and sentenced to 12 years in 
prison. Mariano received a temporary visa for his testimo-
ny against Cesar. He still picks tomatoes but he is no longer 
a SLAVE.
The state investigators are figured as benevolent protectors, even 
though undocumented workers are actually extremely vulnerable to 
police coercion and intimidation due to their status. As Alicia Peters 
demonstrates in Responding to Human Trafficking: Sex, Gender, and 
Culture in the Law, they very rarely receive documentation-based 
protections from the state in return for their testimony. The crime of 
smuggling is represented as an evil choice by bad people that can be 
eradicated through punishment. Incarceration is held up as a natural 
resolution to socioeconomic problems, which have in fact been creat-
ed by the state. 
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Selective condemnation naturalises everyday violence
Cesar’s arrest does nothing to keep Mariano safe in the fields or more 
financially secure in his home country. The panel suggests that the 
state cares for Mariano by providing him with a legal status, which one 
would think prevents him from being exploited by employers without 
redress. However, the legal working conditions for H-2A workers are 
abysmal and even the low standards often go unenforced.
For instance, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) excludes all farm-
workers from overtime pay regardless of hours worked, and its federal 
minimum wage provisions are rampantly ignored by growers without 
consequence. How, then, does a temporary visa and an incarcerated 
perpetrator release Mariano from his enslavement? He is still subject 
to the structures that create his conditions. As a tomato-picker in the 
United States, he remains vulnerable to terrible working conditions, 
and is either lowly-paid or not paid at all. Why is one condition ren-
dered as slavery and the other not?
By suggesting that only the most extreme forms of smuggling are the 
problem, the everyday exploitation of migrant farm work becomes 
naturalised. Emphasising the violence of smuggling as perpetrated by 
individuals obscures state-sanctioned and state-inflicted violence. A 
panel describes Mariano’s “escape”: 
The work was brutal and exhausting. Anything that pre-
vented Mariano from working resulted in beatings, knife 
slashing, or chain shackles. Worst of all was the isolation: 
no family or friends knew where he was. One day in 2007, 
Mariano was locked inside his home, a truck. Seeing a hole 
in the roof, he punched until it was big enough to wriggle 
through and then escaped.
In this rendering, physical confinement and physical abuse are the 
problems. The evil acts of the smuggler are the barriers to freedom, 
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which is defined as the return of mobility and the absence of immedi-
ate physical abuse. Structural freedom remains unaddressed: neither 
the freedom to cross borders safely and legally nor the freedom to be 
safe after “escape” are problematised. Turning structural violence and 
exclusion into the sadistic tendencies of a villain becomes the state’s 
ultimate alibi. Even though the state creates the conditions necessary 
for precarious and exploitable migrant labour, the discourse of en-
slavement allows the state to present its carceral solutions—putting 
‘bad’ people in prison—as ‘abolition’. The invisibility of the role of state 
violence is aided by sensationalist representations of interpersonal vi-
olence in the museum’s exhibit. 
In representing Mariano’s story as such, the museum’s curators and 
their non-profit collaborators support the state’s approach to ‘ending’ 
trafficking, which does nothing to protect labourers but does legiti-
mise the growing carceral logic of the United States government. By 
extension, the museum obscures the realities of present-day labour 
exploitation and perpetuates the alibi of the state. In doing so, it misses 
an opportunity to compare and contrast the chattel slavery of previous 
centuries—a historic form of agricultural subsidy—with more con-
temporary ways to maximise agricultural profits for owners of capital. 

Section four
A future beyond bordering?
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Ferries not Frontex! 10 points to end the deaths 
of migrants at sea
The EU response to the increasing number of migrant deaths in the 
Mediterranean Sea is riddled with falsity. Activists in touch with many of 
those attempting to cross respond.
The Alarm Phone
On April 20 2015, the Joint Foreign and Home Affairs Council of the EU 
released a ten- point action plan outlining their response to the recent 
deaths of migrants in the Mediterranean Sea. Many other proposals have 
also been made over the last few days. We are activists who have been 
involved in the struggles against the European border regime for several 
years and who have been in touch on a daily basis with hundreds of 
people who have crossed the Mediterranean through Watch The Med and 
the Alarm Phone project. Faced with the hypocrisy of the “solutions” that 
have been proposed so far, we feel compelled to undermine their falsity 
and attempt to open up an alternative space for reflection and action.
1. We are shocked and angered at the recent tragedies that have 
claimed at least 1,200 lives in the Mediterranean Sea in the last 
week. We are shocked, although not surprised, by the unprece-
dented number of deaths in merely a few days. We are angered 
because we know that without a radical change these are just the 
first of many more deaths to come in 2015.
2. We are also angered because we know that what is proposed to 
us as a “solution” to this unbearable situation only amounts to 
more of the same: violence and death. The EU has called for the 
reinforcement of Frontex’ Triton mission. Frontex is a migration 
deterrence agency and Triton has been created with the clear 
mandate to protect borders, not to save lives.
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3. However, even if saving lives was to be its core task, as it was 
the case for the military- humanitarian operation mare nostrum 
in 2014, it is clear that this would not bring dying at sea to an 
end. Those who suggest a European mare nostrum should be re-
minded that even during its mission, the most grandiose rescue 
operation in the Mediterranean to date, more than 3,400 people 
died. Is this figure acceptable to the European public?
4. Others have called for an international military operation in 
Libya, a naval blockade, or the further enlisting of African coun-
tries for the policing of their own land borders. The history of 
the last twenty years in the Mediterranean shows that stepping 
up the militarisation of migration routes is only going to cause 
more death. Each and every time a route into Europe has been 
blocked by new surveillance technologies and increasing polic-
ing, migrants have not stopped arriving. They have simply been 
forced to take longer and more dangerous routes. The recent 
deaths in the Central and Eastern Mediterranean are the result of 
the militarisation of the Gibraltar Strait, of the Canary Islands, of 
the land border between Greece and Turkey, and of several land 
borders in the Sahara. The “successes” of Frontex mean death to 
thousands of people.
5. International organisations as well politicians from across the 
whole political spectrum have denounced smugglers as the main 
cause of death in the Mediterranean Sea. Several prominent pol-
iticians have compared the smuggling of migrants to the transat-
lantic slave trade. There seems no limit to hypocrisy: those who 
uphold the slave regime condemning the slave traders! We know 
very well that smugglers operating in the context of the Libyan 
civil war are often ruthless criminals. But we also know that the 
only reason why migrants have to resort to them is the European 
border regime. Smuggling networks would be history in no time 
if those who now die at sea could instead reach Europe legally. 
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The visa regime that prevents them from doing so was intro-
duced only 25 years ago.
6. Those who have called, once again, for the creation of asylum 
processing centres in Northern Africa should be reminded of 
two examples that are the most accurate examples of what these 
centres would actually mean. First, the Tunisian Choucha camp 
managed by the UNHCR, which abandoned those who sought 
refuge there from the Libyan conflict. Even those who were rec-
ognised as needing international protections were left behind in 
the Tunisian desert, often without any other choice than trying 
to cross the sea. Second, the creation by Australia of offshore pro-
cessing centres on remote “prison- islands”, which is now hailed 
by many as a role model for Europe, only shows how hideous 
the forceful confinement of asylum seekers can be. These “solu-
tions” serve only to displace the violence of the European border 
regime away from the eyes of Western publics.
7. Faced with this situation, what is to be done? Comrades and 
friends with whom we have shared common struggles in the 
past years have been calling for freedom of movement as the 
only viable response to this situation. We too make this demand 
ours, as it is the only one that has managed to open up a space 
of political imagination in an otherwise suffocating debate. Only 
unconditional legal access to the EU can end the death of mi-
grants at sea. And yet we think that a general call for the freedom 
of movement is not enough in the current context. We want to 
consider the freedom of movement not as a distant utopia but as 
a practice—enacted by migrants on a daily basis often at the cost 
of their lives—that should guide our political struggles.
8. These are the reasons why we call for the institution of a human-
itarian ferry, that should travel to Libya and evacuate as many 
people as possible. These people should be brought to Europe 
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and granted unconditional protection in Europe, without under-
going an asylum process which has lost its original purpose to 
protect and has de facto become yet another tool of exclusion.
9. Is the idea of a ferry unrealistic? In 2011, at the height of the 
Libyan civil war, humanitarian ferries evacuated thousands of 
stranded migrants from Misrata to Bengasi, overcoming obsta-
cles such as shelling, constant fire, and sea mines. This shows that 
even in the current volatile situation of Libya, considering such 
an action is possible. Moreover, ferries would certainly be im-
mensely cheaper than the prospect of a massive rescue mission 
at sea and of any military solution.
10. The only reality we know is that any solution short of this will 
continue to lead to more deaths at sea. We know that no pro-
cess of externalisation of asylum procedures and border control, 
no amount of compliance with the legal obligations to rescue, 
no increase in surveillance and militarisation will stop the mass 
dying at sea. In the immediate term, all we need is legal access 
and ferries. Will the EU and international agencies be ready to 
take these steps, or will civil society have to do it for them?
Originally published by The Alarm Phone.
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The case for open borders
The discretionary control that states exercise over immigration is unjust. 
People should be free to cross borders and live wherever they choose.
Joseph H. Carens
Borders have guards and the guards have guns. This is an obvious fact 
of political life but one that is easily hidden from view—at least from 
the view of those of us who are citizens of affluent democracies. If we 
see the guards at all, we find them reassuring because we think of them 
as there to protect us rather than to keep us out. To Africans in small, 
leaky vessels seeking to avoid patrol boats while they cross the Mediter-
ranean to southern Europe, or to Mexicans willing to risk death from 
heat and exposure in the Arizona desert to evade the fences and border 
patrols, it is quite different. To these people, the borders, guards, and 
guns are all too apparent, their goal of exclusion all too real. What jus-
tifies the use of force against such people? Perhaps borders and guards 
can be justified as a way of keeping out terrorists, armed invaders, or 
criminals. But most of those trying to get in are not like that. They 
are ordinary, peaceful people, seeking only the opportunity to build 
decent, secure lives for themselves and their families. On what moral 
grounds can we deny entry to these sorts of people? What gives anyone 
the right to point guns at them?
To many people the answer to this question will seem obvious. The 
power to admit or exclude non-citizens is inherent in sovereignty and 
essential for any political community that seeks to exercise self-deter-
mination. Every state has the legal and moral right to exercise con-
trol over admissions in pursuit of its own national interest and the 
common good of the members of its community, even if that means 
denying entry to peaceful, needy foreigners. States may choose to be 
generous in admitting immigrants, but, in most cases at least, they are 
under no moral obligation to do so.
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I want to challenge that view. In principle, borders should generally 
be open and people should normally be free to leave their country of 
origin and settle wherever they choose. This critique of exclusion has 
particular force with respect to restrictions on movement from devel-
oping states to Europe and North America, but it applies generally.
In many ways, citizenship in western democracies is the modern 
equivalent of feudal class privilege—an inherited status that greatly en-
hances one’s life chances. To be born a citizen of a rich state in Europe 
or North America is like being born into the nobility (even though 
many of us belong to the lesser nobility). To be born a citizen of a poor 
country in Asia or Africa is like being born into the peasantry in the 
Middle Ages (even if there are a few rich peasants and some peasants 
manage to gain entry to the nobility). Like feudal birthright privileges, 
contemporary social arrangements not only grant great advantages on 
the basis of birth but also entrench these advantages by legally restrict-
ing mobility, making it extremely difficult for those born into a socially 
disadvantaged position to overcome that disadvantage, no matter how 
talented they are or how hard they work. Like feudal practices, these 
Strep72 /Flickr. Creative Commons.
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contemporary social arrangements are hard to justify when one thinks 
about them closely.
Reformers in the late Middle Ages objected to the way feudalism re-
stricted freedom, including the freedom of individuals to move from 
one place to another in search of a better life—a constraint that was 
crucial to the maintenance of the feudal system. Modern practices of 
state control over borders tie people to the land of their birth almost 
as effectively. Limiting entry to rich democratic states is a mechanism 
for protecting a birthright privilege. If the feudal practices protecting 
birthright privileges were wrong, what justifies the modern ones? 
The case for open borders
The analogy I have just drawn with feudalism is designed to give read-
ers pause about the conventional view that restrictions on immigra-
tion by democratic states are normally justified. Now let me outline 
the positive case for open borders. I start from three basic interrelated 
assumptions. First, there is no natural social order. The institutions 
and practices that govern human beings are ones that human beings 
have created and can change, at least in principle. Second, in evalu-
ating the moral status of alternative forms of political and social or-
ganisation, we must start from the premise that all human beings are 
of equal moral worth. Third, restrictions on the freedom of human 
beings require a moral justification. These three assumptions are not 
just my views. They undergird the claim to moral legitimacy of every 
contemporary democratic regime.
The assumption that all human beings are of equal moral worth does 
not mean that no legal distinctions can be drawn among different 
groups of people, nor does the requirement that restrictions on free-
dom be justified mean that coercion is never defensible. But these two 
assumptions, together with the assumption that the social order is not 
naturally given, mean that we have to give reasons for our institutions 
and practices and that those reasons must take a certain form. It is 
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never enough to justify a set of social arrangements governing human 
beings by saying that these arrangements are good for us, whoever the 
‘us’ may be, without regard for others. We have to appeal to principles 
and arguments that take everyone’s interests into account or that ex-
plain why the social arrangements are reasonable and fair to everyone 
who is subject to them.
Given these three assumptions there is at least a prima facie case that 
borders should be open, for, again, three interrelated reasons. First, 
state control over immigration limits freedom of movement. The right 
to go where you want is an important human freedom in itself. It is 
precisely this freedom, and all that this freedom makes possible, that 
is taken away by imprisonment. Freedom of movement is also a pre-
requisite to many other freedoms. If people are to be free to live their 
lives as they choose, so long as this does not interfere with the legiti-
mate claims of others, they have to be free to move where they want. 
Thus freedom of movement contributes to individual autonomy both 
directly and indirectly. Open borders would enhance this freedom. 
Of course, freedom of movement cannot be an unqualified right, if 
only for reasons like traffic control and other requirements of public 
order. But restrictions require a moral justification, i.e., some argu-
ment as to why the restriction is in the interest of, and fair to, all those 
who are subject to it. Since state control over immigration restricts 
human freedom of movement, it requires a justification. This justifi-
cation must take into account the interests of those excluded as well 
as the interests of those already inside. It must make the case that the 
restrictions on immigration are fair to all human beings. There are re-
strictions on border crossing that meet this standard of justification 
(e.g. limiting the entry of terrorists and invading armies), but granting 
states discretionary control over immigration does not. 
The second reason why borders should normally be open is that free-
dom of movement is essential for equality of opportunity. Within dem-
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ocratic states we all recognise, at least in principle, that access to social 
positions should be determined by an individual’s actual talents and 
effort, and not on the basis of birth-related characteristics such as class, 
race, or gender that are not relevant to the capacity to perform well in 
the position. This ideal of equal opportunity is intimately linked to the 
view that all human beings are of equal moral worth, that there are no 
natural hierarchies of birth that entitle people to advantageous social 
positions. But you have to be able to move to where the opportunities 
are in order to take advantage of them. So, freedom of movement is an 
essential prerequisite for equality of opportunity. 
It is in the linkage between freedom of movement and equality of 
opportunity that the analogy with feudalism cuts most deeply. Under 
feudalism, there was no commitment to equal opportunity. The social 
circumstances of one’s birth largely determined one’s opportunities, 
and restrictions on freedom of movement were an essential element in 
maintaining the limitations on the opportunities of those with talent 
and motivation but the wrong class background (gender was another 
pervasive constraint). In the modern world, we have created a social 
order in which there is a commitment to equality of opportunity for 
people within democratic states (at least to some extent), but no pre-
tence of, or even aspiration to, equality of opportunity for people across 
states. Because of the state’s discretionary control over immigration, 
the opportunities for people in one state are simply closed to those 
from another (for the most part). Since the range of opportunities 
varies so greatly among states, this means that in our world, as in feu-
dalism, the social circumstances of one’s birth largely determine one’s 
opportunities. It also means that restrictions on freedom of movement 
are an essential element in maintaining this arrangement, i.e., in lim-
iting the opportunities of people with talents and motivations but the 
wrong social circumstances of birth. Again, the challenge for those 
who would defend restrictions on immigration is to justify the result-
ing inequalities of opportunity. That is hard to do. 
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A third, closely related point is that a commitment to equal moral 
worth entails some commitment to economic, social, and political 
equality, partly as a means of realising equal freedom and equal op-
portunity and partly as a desirable end in itself. Freedom of movement 
would contribute to a reduction of existing political, social, and eco-
nomic inequalities. There are millions of people in poor states today 
who long for the freedom and economic opportunity they could find 
in Europe or North America. Many of them take great risks to come. 
If the borders were open, millions more would move. The exclusion 
of so many poor and desperate people seems hard to justify from a 
perspective that takes seriously the claims of all individuals as free and 
equal moral persons.
This essay is a slight adaptation of the opening pages of chapter 11 
in my book The Ethics of Immigration (Oxford University Press, 2013), 
which was in turn largely drawn from an earlier essay: “Aliens and 
Citizens: the Case for Open Borders,” Review of Politics Vol. 49, No. 2 
(Spring): 251-273.
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Thinking about open borders
The free movement of people across international borders is a taboo 
in international political debates, making a thorough and much-needed 
rethinking of migration politics impossible. This must change.
Antoine Pécoud
The free movement of people across state borders is a taboo in in-
ternational political debates. Borders, it is often argued, would play 
a decreasing role in a globalising world. And indeed, there is strong 
support for the free circulation of goods, capitals, services, and infor-
mation. But, when it comes to people this no longer applies. The idea 
that human beings could be free to move from one state to another, 
choosing where they want to live, is usually dismissed as unrealistic. 
The unchallenged assumption is that peoples’ access to countries other 
than their own should be carefully monitored and controlled. 
Opening state borders to human migration would certainly be no easy 
scenario. It would constitute a complete upheaval in the world’s organ-
isation and raise more than a few fundamental questions. But does this 
prevent us from at least thinking about this scenario? Many of today’s 
realities used to be deemed ‘unrealistic’, from the abolition of slavery 
to gender equality. Yet, even those who are deeply dissatisfied with 
today’s world rarely consider this particular scenario. The United Na-
tions repeatedly calls for many goals that are hardly ‘realistic’—world 
peace, ending poverty, and so on—but never mentions open borders. 
The same could be said of NGOs. Most of them, even those that are 
actively engaged in the promotion of migrants’ rights, take migration 
control for granted. In other words, many objectives exist that are ex-
traordinarily difficult to achieve yet are never rejected as illegitimate. 
The free movement of people is not one of them. 
When it comes to human mobility, the objective is almost always to 
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move towards greater immobility. Except for the wealthiest parts of 
the global population, people may only move for specific and well-de-
fined reasons (asylum, family reunification, labor market shortages 
in receiving countries, etc.), and only under the close supervision of 
governments or employers. Development efforts, for example, regu-
larly aim at enabling (or forcing?) the inhabitants of less-developed 
regions to stay there. Even when people move, the implicit goal for 
both sending and receiving states is that they eventually return. Thus, 
so-called ‘counter-trafficking’ measures strive to return the ‘victims’ 
of trafficking to their country, as if their vulnerability was only caused 
by their displacement. The same ‘there-is-no-place-like-home’ spirit 
characterises the treatment of refugees, pushed to go back to their re-
gion as soon as it has regained a minimum of security and stability. 
Economic migrants, too, are regularly expected to be ‘guestworkers’, 
remaining in and contributing to the ‘host’ country only as long as 
their presence is desired. 
Perhaps because of this sedentary obsession, migration is perceived as 
a challenge in many parts of the world. Regardless of the evidence, mi-
grants are understood as ‘problems’ and as a cause of insecurity, unem-
ployment, welfare abuse, social disintegration, and so on. But nobody 
seems to know what the solution should look like. The only strategy 
seems to be to reinforce and strengthen, again and again, the different 
measures blocking mobility: technology (biometrics, ‘smart borders’); 
state cooperation (Frontex, readmission agreements, ‘migration and 
development partnerships’); and standard patterns of border control 
(fences, expulsions). Given the longstanding failure of these efforts to 
prevent all informal entry, the only question that remains is whether 
these are genuine but naïve attempts to stop people, or more cynical 
tools to increase migrants’ vulnerability and therefore their exploit-
ability. 
It is high time, therefore, to stop thinking about how to keep peo-
ple in their place, and to recognise the normality and legitimacy of 
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human mobility. The point is not to deny that migration raises certain 
problems. Rather, it is to suggest that these problems will not disap-
pear simply if people stay at home. Moreover, the more states aim at 
stopping people, the more problematic and disturbing the ethical and 
political foundations of border control appear. In a world marked by 
sharp, increasing socioeconomic imbalances, how much longer will 
we be able to justify the position that living conditions should be a 
correlate of our countries of birth?
Citizens of the global north can move quite easily across the world, 
whereas their fellow human beings in the global south are much more 
restricted. Is this fair? In the same vein, why should skilled people, 
like engineers, doctors or businesspeople, have easier access to op-
portunities abroad than their ‘unskilled’ compatriots? Employers and 
companies benefit from the liberalisation of trade in a globalising 
economy, but workers do not enjoy the same mobility: is this merely 
a way to favor capital to the detriment of labor and, if so, should this 
be left uncontested? If all human beings were fortunate enough to live 
in reasonably wealthy countries, with acceptable living and working 
conditions, these questions would perhaps be irrelevant. But this is not 
the case, and the ugly realities of our world are becoming increasingly 
difficult to ignore. 
Migrants themselves do not ignore these questions. Migration, and es-
pecially irregular migration, is often rooted in a kind of global justice 
framework: people go where they think they can make a better living 
and, usually, share the benefits with those left behind (e.g. through re-
mittances). Border control may make migration more difficult, but it 
does not convince many migrants that moving without authorisation 
is really unacceptable—that they shouldn’t try just because they were 
told no. Indeed, migrants’ independent agency is arguably the single 
biggest obstacle to measures aimed at preventing irregular migration. 
Of course, these arguments do not exhaust the issue. In particular, they 
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clash with another set of equally valid arguments, which pertain to the 
centrality of closeness for solidarity and justice. Welfare, for example, 
is often thought to imply a degree of national closure to be meaningful. 
The same applies to democracy and, in a broader fashion, to the sense 
of identity and cultural sameness that, according to some, makes col-
lective life possible and desirable. From this perspective, open borders 
is a misleadingly attractive objective. By destroying the foundations 
of nation-states, free movement would actually reinforce the already 
strong tendency towards neoliberal individualism. 
This is a well-known and much-discussed dilemma, to which there is 
no easy solution. It is fair to observe, however, that current efforts to 
stop migration do not appear to automatically translate into greater in-
state solidarity. Rather, the discourse against immigration tends to be 
fundamentally biased and damaging to domestic solidarity, as it rages 
against irregular migration while discreetly tolerating the presence of 
irregular migrants and taking advantage of their disadvantaged status. 
This does nothing but reinforce internal divides and tensions inside 
societies, the worst possible scenario for anyone who does not benefit 
from migrants’ under-protection.
Equally problematic, the entire basis for the discussion on immigra-
tion control rests on the fictitious idea that people ‘naturally’ stay at 
home. This is not only questionable from a historical and empirical 
standpoint, but more importantly it justifies and perpetuates a status 
quo that benefits neither migrants nor receiving societies. The first 
step for rethinking the politics of migration is therefore to challenge 
its most fundamental assumptions. In order to do this we must—at 
least—open the debate on the free movement of people. 
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